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Abstract 
This dissertation focuses on corporate finance and banking.  Chapter 1 examines the way 
creditor rights affect borrower financing and investment decisions. By utilizing a sample 
of over 1.5 million public and privately held firms within Europe, it is the most 
comprehensive analysis of the impact of creditor protection on the demand side of the 
credit market. The heterogeneity within this sample also allows for a more detailed 
understanding of the ways different types of firms are impacted. I find that greater levels 
of creditor protection overall lead to higher firm leverage, especially for firms with lower 
tangible assets. Smaller firms are able to borrow more when the secured creditor is paid 
first, which leads to higher investment. However, firms with high levels of tangible assets 
that operate in economies with stronger creditor rights fear inefficient liquidation, which 
leads them to decrease their financial leverage as well as cash-flow risk, even if it means 
pursuing unprofitable projects. Creditor rights also amplify the agency conflict between 
debt and equity holders in the sense of the risk-shifting literature and lead to increased 
risk-taking and decreased profitability for highly levered firms. 
 
Chapter 2 focuses on the policy of Too-Big-To-Fail banks.  While the policy of Too-Big-
To-Fail has received wide attention in the literature, there is little agreement regarding 
economies of scale for financial firms. We take the stand that systemic risk increases 
when the larger players in the financial sector have a larger share of output. Calculations 
indicate that the cost to the macro-economy due to increased systemic risk is always 
much larger than the potential benefit due to scale economies. When distributional and 
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intergenerational issues are considered, the potential benefits to economies of scale are 
unlikely to ever exceed the potential costs due to increased risk of a banking crisis. 
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Chapter 1 
Efficient Contracting, Creditor Rights, and Corporate Finance: An 
International Perspective1 
 
Chapter 1 Summary 
This paper examines the way creditor rights affect borrower financing and investment 
decisions. By utilizing a sample of over 1.5 million public and privately held firms within 
Europe, it is the most comprehensive analysis of the impact of creditor protection on the 
demand side of the credit market. The heterogeneity within this sample also allows for a 
more detailed understanding of the ways different types of firms are impacted. I find that 
greater levels of creditor protection overall lead to higher firm leverage, especially for 
firms with lower tangible assets. Smaller firms are able to borrow more when the secured 
creditor is paid first, which leads to higher investment. However, firms with high levels 
of tangible assets that operate in economies with stronger creditor rights fear inefficient 
liquidation, which leads them to decrease their financial leverage as well as cash-flow 
risk, even if it means pursuing unprofitable projects. Creditor rights also amplify the 
agency conflict between debt and equity holders in the sense of the risk-shifting literature 
and lead to increased risk-taking and decreased profitability for highly levered firms. 
 
                                                 
1 I cannot thank my advisers, John H. Boyd, Andrew Winton, and Tracy Yue Wang, 
enough for their guidance, patience, and helpful comments. I'd also like to thank Ross 
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University of Hawaii (Shidler), University of Minnesota (Carlson), University of 
Wisconsin at Milwaukee (Lubar), Tulane University (Freeman), Any remaining errors are 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The relationship between investor protection and economic development has 
received a considerable amount of attention since the seminal cross-country study 
conducted by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1998). The bulk of the existing 
finance literature pertaining to creditor rights focuses on the way they affect investors. A 
large body of theoretical literature examines the supply side of the credit market and 
formalizes the idea that lenders are more likely to extend credit when they have the 
ability to force repayment, seize collateral, or even remove management (Townsend, 
1979; Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Hart and Moore, 1994, 1998).  
The cross-country empirical study by Djankov, McLiesh, and Schleifer (2007) confirms 
the theory's predictions and finds that greater investor protection is associated with more 
aggregate private credit. Though the theory literature has given considerable attention to 
the way creditor protection affects creditors, there has been little focus regarding the way 
creditor protection affects borrower financing and investment decisions, especially 
outside of bankruptcy, which is the primary goal of this study. 
This study is the most comprehensive study examining the effects of creditor 
rights on the demand side of the credit market. This analysis is conducted using an 
extensive panel of over 1.5 million public and private European firms from the Amadeus 
Database, which is the ideal setting for the analysis, since investor protection varies 
dramatically across Europe. I examine over 4.3 million firm-year observations that span 
twenty developed and emerging market countries. Over 99% of the final sample is 
privately held firms that are most likely to be impacted by the country-level creditor 
rights variables. The heterogeneity within this data set allows me to perform cross-
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sectional tests to examine specific hypotheses suggested by the existing finance literature. 
These cross-sectional tests are also able to be performed using country-level fixed effects 
to allow for better identification than the previous literature. 
Additionally, the elements of the creditor rights index2 proposed by La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer (1998) are examined separately. Many papers only examine the 
aggregate index as a whole, but for the demand side of the loan market, it is not obvious 
that all elements of the index influence borrower decision-making in the same way. In 
fact, whether the secured creditor has absolute priority over the government or 
employees, has a particularly large effect on firm financing and investment decisions. By 
examining the creditor rights components separately, this study provides insight as to 
which components matter more for financing and investment and ultimately drive the 
effect of the aggregate index.  
The first empirical task presented in this paper is to understand how creditor 
rights impact firm leverage. I utilize the cross-sectional variation within the sample to test 
whether firms that cannot access credit easily have higher leverage when creditors are 
better protected. Stronger creditor protection is associated with higher firm leverage 
overall, and cross-sectional tests indicate that it is easier for firms that have less 
collateral, as proxied by levels of tangible assets, are able to acquire more loans when 
creditor rights are higher. Smaller firms are also able to obtain more credit in countries 
where the secured creditor is paid first, though other aspects of the creditor rights index 
are associated with more borrowing by larger firms. In subsequent analysis, I will use an 
                                                 
2 The index components consist of restrictions on reorganization, no automatic stay of 
assets, secured creditor paid first, and management removal. 
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instrumental variable framework to better understand the relationship between creditor 
protection and borrower leverage. 
The second empirical task this paper has is to gain a better understanding of the 
way creditor rights impact firm investment policy outside of bankruptcy. To the extent 
that firms are able to borrow more, I examine whether they invest the additional capital 
into tangible assets to grow their business. I find that when the secured creditor is paid 
first, small firms increase investment in tangible assets.  
I also examine whether creditor rights contribute to overall firm cash-flow risk 
and profitability, since stronger creditor rights give investors more power in determining 
the bankruptcy and liquidation processes. There are two views on the ways creditor rights 
may affect firm risk-taking. Acharya, Amihud, and Litov (2011) suggest that when 
creditor rights are high, firms reduce risk-taking, even if it means pursuing unprofitable 
projects, because they fear inefficient liquidation. However, granting debt holders more 
power may worsen the agency conflict between debt and equity holders. The risk-shifting 
literature (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), suggests that as this agency conflict worsens, the 
firm will pursue riskier projects with lower mean returns.  
The empirical results indicate that when investor protection is higher, firms with 
high levels of tangible assets reduce cash-flow risk and realize lower profitability, 
consistent with the hypothesis that they are trying to reduce the likelihood of inefficient 
liquidation. However, for firms where the agency conflict between debt and equity 
holders is most severe, as evidenced by high leverage ratios, creditor lead to increased 
cash-flow risk and decreased profitability overall. This is consistent with the risk-shifting 
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literature, suggesting creditor rights amplify this the agency conflict presented in this 
literature. 
With a few exceptions, the majority of the existing empirical literature examining 
the effects of creditor rights on the loan market either interprets aggregate national data or 
focuses on supply-side data with only a few exceptions. Unfortunately, these data sets do 
not provide very much insight regarding how creditor rights affect the demand side of the 
loan market. Since equilibrium is determined by both supply and demand forces, it's 
important to gain a better understanding of the demand side of the credit market in order 
to fully understand the implications of creditor rights on the entire economy. 
This paper belongs to a growing literature examining the impact of investor 
protection on creditors and debtors and arrives at three main contributions. First, this 
paper adds to the understanding of the way creditor rights impact the entire demand side 
of the credit market by including private firms, and thus allowing for a set of more 
generalized conclusions regarding the way creditor rights impact borrowers to be drawn. 
The few existing studies examining the demand-side of the market analyze large publicly 
traded companies, which are problematic for a few reasons. These firms have access to 
more substitute types of financing, such as the equity and international debt markets. As a 
result, they may be less sensitive to the local creditor rights environment. In addition, 
these firms represent only a small proportion of the firms within a given economy, and 
examining them does not give a complete picture of the way creditor rights affect the 
majority of firms.  
Second, this paper adds to a very small literature examining how creditor rights 
affect investment policy outside of bankruptcy. This paper examines multiple outcome 
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variables, and the cross-sectional tests provide insight regarding the way creditor rights 
affect different types of firms. Finally, the paper analyzes the individual components of 
the creditor rights index and finds that they influence borrowers in different ways. These 
results can provide important insights for developing countries that are actively reforming 
their bankruptcy laws and creditor protections in order to boost their credit markets.  
 
 
2 Literature Review 
As previously mentioned, much of the existing theoretical literature examining 
creditor rights focuses on the way investors respond to increased protection. Theoretical 
literature has come to the conclusion that investor rights encourage creditors to extend 
more credit. When investors are able to seize collateral or recover more of their losses in 
bankruptcy, they can afford to take more risk and make more loans, though Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981) suggests that creditors may ration some borrowers. One empirical cross-
country study has found that more private credit exists in countries with greater creditor 
rights (Djankov, McLiesh, and Schleifer, 2007).  
On the supply side of the loan market, it has been shown that as investor 
protection increases, creditors extend more loans and lend to more risky borrowers, 
especially when government guarantees are in place (Djankov, McLiesh, and Schleifer, 
2007; Houston, Lin, Lin and Ma, 2010; Jayaraman and Thakor, 2013 and Boyd and 
Hakenes, 2013). Creditors also monitor less when they have more rights (Jayaraman and 
Thakor, 2013) and play an active role in the governance of corporations, even outside of 
default states (Nini, Smith, and Sufi, 2009, 2012). The existence of more investor 
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protection has also been associated with lower interest rates charged and longer loan 
maturities (Qian and Strahan, 2007 and Bae and Goyal, 2009). On the demand side of the 
market, borrowers may adjust their borrowing and investment decisions based on these 
effects. More recently, a small number of studies examining borrower-level studies have 
emerged, though these studies reach conflicting conclusions and suffer from a number of 
empirical challenges.  
The empirical evidence relating creditor rights to borrower leverage is often 
contradictory. Acharya, Amihud, and Litov (2011) find that as creditor rights are higher, 
firms reduce risk-taking by engaging in diversifying acquisitions and reducing financial 
leverage. Within G-7 countries, Rajan and Zingales (1995) show that bankruptcy codes 
that favor debtors do not by themselves lead to a lower use of debt, and Acharya and 
Subramanian (2009) find evidence of lower leverage in public technologically innovative 
industries at the firm-level for their sample when investor friendly bankruptcy codes are 
in place. Acharya, Sundaram, and John (2011) develop a model linking bankruptcy codes 
to capital structure choices and find that that the difference in leverage choices under a 
relatively equity-friendly bankruptcy code (such as the US’s) and one that is relatively 
more debt-friendly (such as the UK’s) is a decreasing function of the anticipated 
liquidation value of the firm’s assets. Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano (2009) and Giannetti 
(2003) find a positive relationship between creditor rights and firm leverage in their 
samples consisting primarily of unlisted firms. At the individual loan-level, Bae and 
Goyal (2009) examine individual loan data from syndicated bank loans and find evidence 
that suggests smaller loans are granted in lower creditor rights environments, though 
these results do not appear statistically significant in their tests.  
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There are two main views on the way creditor rights may influence borrower risk-
taking. First, the risk-shifting literature, focusing on the agency conflict between debt 
holders and equity holders, finds that as debt holders have more to gain in bankruptcy and 
equity holders have less to lose (higher creditor rights), the equity holders take on more 
risk and invest in projects that have higher variances, despite the projects having lower 
means (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Second, Acharya, Amihud, and Litov (2011) 
suggest that stronger creditor rights cause firms to pursue a risk-reducing strategy, where 
they are willing to pursue risk-reducing strategies such as diversifying acquisitions, even 
if they are not profitable. The law literature (Adler, 1992) suggests that as firms approach 
bankruptcy, stronger creditor rights may induce them to take on more risk, but ex ante, 
more investor protection causes a reduction in risk-taking, which is a combination of the 
two proposed hypotheses.  
Many of the studies previously mentioned view leverage as a way to reduce firm 
risk-taking. Outside of reduced leverage, a small group of studies have examined the 
relationship between creditor protection and other measures of firm risk-taking, such as 
cash-flow risk. John, Litov, and Yeung (2008) find evidence that better investor 
protection leads to increased risk-taking for manufacturing firms from 39 countries, and 
both Allen and Gale (1997) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) argue that economies that 
provide more risk-sharing lead to more risk-taking and ultimately growth. Acharya and 
Subramanian (2009) find that creditor friendly bankruptcy codes prohibit innovation.  
Furthermore, it has been suggested that creditor rights are negatively related to 
profitability. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that when equity holders have less to 
gain in bankruptcy states, they will pursue projects with more risk, despite having lower 
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mean returns. Acharya, Amihud, and Litov (2011) also find that in high creditor rights 
environments, diversifying acquisitions are followed by lower profitability and that their 
announcement induces more negative stock price reaction. 
The existing papers examining the link between creditor rights and borrower 
leverage reach varying conclusions, as discussed above, partially because the samples 
that they examine are dramatically different from one another. The borrower-level studies 
that find a negative relationship between investor protection and firm leverage primarily 
examine large public firms in developed economies with established equity markets, 
which could act as substitutes for bank loans (Acharya and Subramanian, 2009 and 
Acharya, Amihud, and Litov, 2011).  
In a stark contrast, Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano (2009) examine small firms in 
emerging market countries and find that creditor rights are positively associated with firm 
leverage. This finding could be evidence of supply-side increases in lending leading, but 
it could also be indicative of an increase in firm demand for loans. Because of these large 
sample variations and differing conclusions, there is a need to examine the impact of 
creditor rights on multiple outcome variables with a more representative set of public and 
private firms that span economies with varying levels of development and investor 
protection. 
 
 
3 Empirical Design 
3.1 Tangibility, Size, and Firm Leverage 
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The primary goal of this study is to understand the impact creditor rights have on 
firm-level leverage. First, an ordinary least squares framework is utilized in order to 
understand the overall relationship between creditor rights and firm borrowing. After 
gaining an overall impression of the way creditor rights affect firm leverage, more 
specific hypotheses regarding the channels that creditor rights could affect firm 
borrowing are tested.  
Creditor rights may lead to higher leverage because creditors are more willing to 
provide credit. However, they may also decrease borrowing. If firms fear inefficient 
liquidation, they may decrease leverage as a risk-reduction technique. I am specifically 
testing the way creditor rights interact with these firm characteristics, so it is possible to 
use country and year fixed effects. By including country fixed effects, unobserved 
country-specific factors are removed. 
First, I examine the way creditor rights affect the leverage of firms where a high 
percentage of the firm consists of tangible assets. I suspect that firms that cannot offer as 
much collateral, as proxied by asset tangibility, are able to obtain more loans when 
creditor rights are higher. In order to test this hypothesis, I examine the interaction 
between creditor rights and asset tangibility. I expect a negative relationship between the 
interaction term and firm leverage. However, there is an alternative story for the negative 
relationship between the interaction term and firm leverage.  
Acharya, Amihud, and Litov (2011) suggest that creditor rights cause firms to 
reduce leverage as a risk-reduction technique because they fear inefficient liquidation. If 
a firm is approaching bankruptcy, equity holders are interested in continuing firm 
operations, while debt holders may choose to liquidate the firm. If the assets of the firm 
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are primarily in property, plants, equipment, or other tangible assets that can easily be 
sold, the creditors may be more likely to liquidate the firm, sell off the assets, and recover 
their claims. However, if the firm is primarily invested in intangible assets, such as 
research and development, even if the creditor liquidates the firm, the creditor may only 
be able to recover a small claim amount. This may make creditors more likely to allow 
the firm to continue operations. This is an alternative explanation for a negative 
relationship between the interaction term and firm leverage, but further analysis will be 
discussed in section 3.2 to understand if leverage is really being used as a risk-reduction 
technique by these firms. 
Second, I examine the way creditor rights affect the leverage of small firms, a 
sample that has primarily been unanalyzed within the existing literature with the 
exception of Giannetti (2003) and Brown, Jappelli, Pagano (2009). It may seem like a 
paradox that creditor rights have been shown to be associated with more private credit in 
an economy (Djankov, McLiesh, and Schleifer, 2007), yet lower levels of firm borrowing 
(Acharya, Amihud, and Litov, 2011). Acharya, Amihud, and Litov (2011) focuses on the 
way large public firms, that have access to more types of substitute debt such as equity, 
reduce leverage when creditor rights are higher. I focus on a group of firms that are 
private and without access to the equity market. If more private credit exists when 
creditor rights are higher, it may be extended to small firms that have difficulty acquiring 
credit. I expect that creditors are particularly willing to lend to small firms that have low 
levels of assets when they are paid first. On the other hand, larger firms, which 
presumably have less difficulty accessing credit because they have higher levels of assets, 
may be able to obtain more credit in debtor-friendly economies. 
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3.2 Creditor Rights and Loan Utilization 
The next portion of this paper is dedicated to understanding whether creditor 
rights affect firm investment decisions outside of bankruptcy. I examine the impact 
creditor rights have on firm investment in tangible assets, cash-flow risk, and profitability 
outside of bankruptcy states. Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009, 2012) find evidence that 
debtors are able to influence borrower investment decisions outside of bankruptcy states, 
and more creditor friendly bankruptcy codes have been shown to be associated with more 
instances of bankruptcy (Claessens and Klapper, 2005). Investor protection may be an 
important determinant when borrowers are choosing the types of projects to pursue.  
First, I examine whether firms are increasing their capital expenditures as a results 
of greater creditor rights. The empirical evidence shows that the firms in my sample have 
higher leverage when there are greater levels of investor protection. The next set of 
empirical tests “follows the money” and attempts to understand if a portion of this money 
is invested in tangible assets. Furthermore, if firms with low levels of tangible assets or 
total assets are able to acquire more loans, these specific groups may investing more in 
tangible assets.  
Next, I examine the effect creditor rights have on firm cash-flow risk and 
profitability. Acharya, Amihud, and Litov (2011) suggest that firms may decrease risk-
taking and realize less profitability when investor protection is high because they are 
afraid that the creditor will quickly liquidate them in the process of bankruptcy. The risk-
shifting literature (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) suggests that as equity holders have less 
to lose in bankruptcy, they are more likely to engage in riskier projects with lower mean 
returns. The law literature, especially Adler (1982) suggests that ex ante, creditor rights 
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cause firms to decrease risk but that they encourage firms to increase risk-taking as they 
approach bankruptcy. 
I first focus on the impact creditor rights have on firms with high asset tangibility 
by examining the way the interaction between creditor rights and tangibility impact firm 
leverage. If the interaction term is negative, this could indicate that firms with lower asset 
tangibility are able to acquire more credit when investor protection is greater, though it 
could also mean that those with high levels of asset tangibility are reducing leverage as a 
risk-reducing strategy. If the predictions of Acharya, Amihud, and Litov (2011) hold, I 
would expect firms with high liquidation values, as proxied by tangible assets, that 
operate in economies with high creditor rights to reduce cash-flow risk as well as 
leverage. 
I next focus on the impact creditor rights have on firms where the agency conflict 
between debt and equity holders is most severe, which is for highly levered firms. If 
creditors have the ability to approve reorganization, this gives them more power to 
determine whether the firm will be allowed to reorganize and continue operating or 
liquidate. Similarly, if there is no automatic stay of assets in place, the secured creditor is 
paid first, or management is removed, the equity holders lose power either in the times 
before bankruptcy or during the proceedings, worsening the conflict between debt and 
equity holders. I expect that the agency conflict is magnified when in environments with 
high levels of creditor rights. Specifically, I expect that the interaction between creditor 
rights and leverage to negatively affect firm cash-flow risk and profitability. 
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3.3 Creditor Rights and Firm Leverage: Instrumental Variable Analysis 
 In subsequent analysis, I use an instrumental variable framework in order to 
better understand the impact creditor rights have on firm leverage. One of the main 
determinants of firm loan demand is the price that they pay for this debt. I estimate a 
firm-level interest rate to approximate the amount it costs a firm to obtain additional debt.  
However, this price is endogenously determined by both supply. In addition, the 
creditor rights environment may also impact the interest rates, indicating that these 
variables are correlated. Banks may charge lower interest rates when they are more likely 
to be able to recover collateral. Alternatively, they may extend more credit to a pool of 
riskier borrowers, which may raise overall interest rates charged. 
Including the endogenous interest rate in ordinary least squares regression 
framework subjects the estimation to the well-known problem of simultaneous equations 
within the ordinary least squares framework. The coefficient on the endogenous variable, 
the interest rate, as well as any variables correlated with the endogenous one, such as 
creditor rights, are biased. In order to alleviate this bias and obtain a more accurate 
understanding of the way creditor rights impact firm borrowing, it's necessary to use a 
more appropriate econometric framework.  
I utilize an instrumental variable framework to account for the endogeneity of the interest 
rate. The instrument, bank concentration, impacts the interest rate but does not impact 
firm demand for loans. The second stage coefficient on the interest rate indicates the 
effect that an exogenous change in interest rates has on firm leverage. In addition, the 
unbiased second stage creditor rights coefficients indicate a more accurate impact 
creditor rights have on firm leverage. 
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4 Data and Variables of Interest 
The primary data source for this analysis is the 2012 Amadeus Database by 
Bureau Van Dijk. This database has extensive data on nearly public and private company 
in Europe. This database is ideal for this study because it has a wide variety of firms, 
large and small, public and private, spanning multiple industries, and operating in 
countries with varying levels of economic development. By analyzing such a 
comprehensive sample, it is possible to analyze the cross-sectional variation in the way 
creditor rights affect different types of firms.  
Amadeus provides consolidated balance sheet data when it is available and 
unconsolidated balance sheets otherwise. Companies with unconsolidated balance sheets 
report an affiliate's net assets as a long-term investment on their balance sheets, resulting 
in a lower leverage ratio. The firms reporting unconsolidated balance sheets consist of 
less than 1% of the total sample and do not drive the findings within the paper. When 
unconsolidated balance sheets are utilized, results are unchanged. Bureau Van Dijk 
standardizes this balance sheet information with the goal of the data being comparable 
across countries. The data is approved by practitioners, leading accounting firms, and 
passes a rigorous verification process. Though this data set is comprehensive, it does 
have a few problems that need to be addressed. 
The Amadeus data is designed to be comparable across countries, but there are 
cross-country differences in the classification and disclosure requirements between 
countries. German accounting standards place a great deal of value on conservatism, 
which could mean that assets of the firms within Germany are undervalued relative to 
asset values in other European countries. Furthermore, expenditure in research and 
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developments is not required to be disclosed on the firm balance sheets in many 
countries, and Bureau Van Dijk cannot acquire data for small firms in Switzerland. 
Bureau Van Dijk does not reconstruct unreported variables, which could introduce biases. 
This data set has a great deal of missing information, especially for small private firms, 
which limits the sample. As with any cross-country study, it's important to consider the 
comparability of balance sheet data, though both academics and practitioners have relied 
on this data set for analysis.  
Another problem of this data set is the issue of survivorship. If a firm does not 
report financial information for four years following the last included filing, it is dropped 
from the database. Furthermore, Bureau Van Dijk only provides eight years of data for a 
given company. Once the ninth year of data is available, the first year of data is dropped. 
I use the 2012 version of Amadeus, which restricts the analysis to the years 2006-2011.  
Amadeus also provides industry-level information in the form of three-digit 
NACE codes. NACE is the European standard of industry classification. Industry dummy 
variables are constructed for each two-digit NACE code. Financial firms with a NACE 
codes of 65 or 66 are dropped. The data consist of 1,624,761 public and private non-
financial firms present in twenty countries from the Amadeus database for the six years 
between 2006 and 2011. The sample comprises of 4,656,320 firm-year observations. 
Table 1 shows the composition of the firms in the final sample. In total, there are twenty 
countries within the sample, and these countries vary in terms of size, geographic 
location, and economic development. There are 1,621,949 private firms in the final 
sample and only 2,818 public ones. A firm is considered publicly traded if it has a ticker 
symbol, though these firms make up less than 1% of the total sample. 
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Table 1 shows the twenty European countries in the sample and the types of 
creditor rights that are present in each economy. Previous papers utilizing the Global 
Vantage database (Acharya, Amihud, and Litov, 2011 and Acharya and Subramanian, 
2009) have only examined publicly traded companies, and previous literature has shown 
that there are substantial differences between public and private companies (Classens and 
Tzioumis, 2006 and Giannetti, 2003).  
 
4.1 Creditor Rights Variables 
The creditor rights index was originally proposed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer (1998). Later, Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) extended this index to 
129 countries over the years 1978-2003. The La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(1998) Index was available for a single cross-section of countries in the year 1998. The 
Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) version of the index codes insolvency procedures 
slightly differently and provides a time series variation of this variable, though these 
indexes are very highly correlated. The Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) index has 
four components of the creditor rights index, each taking a value of 0 or 1, where higher 
variables indicate more investor protection. The index was constructed on January of 
each year between 1978 and 2003. This study utilizes the most recent 2003 values from 
the Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) study.  
The first element of the creditor rights index is whether or not restrictions, such as 
creditor consent, exist when a borrower files for reorganization. The existence of such 
restrictions means that the value of Reorg for country c in year 2003 takes on the value of 
1. The second element of the index is whether or not secured creditors are able to seize 
  19 
their collateral once a reorganization petition is approved or whether the courts impose an 
automatic stay of assets. If there is no automatic stay of assets in place and secured 
creditors can immediately seize collateral, the variable NoAutostay is 1. If the secured 
creditor is paid first out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt firm, the value of 
Secured is 1. In certain countries, the government or employees have absolute priority 
over secured creditors. I believe that this element of the creditor rights index most closely 
relates to the agency conflict mentioned by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The final 
component of the index, Manages, takes a value of 1 if management is removed during 
times of bankruptcy and an administrator is appointed by the courts to run the firm. The 
creditor rights index, Crights has four components, and each component takes on a value 
of 0 or 1. If the component has a value of 1, this means that the creditors have more 
power. The aggregate index ranges from 0 (low creditor protection) to 4 (high creditor 
protection). 
It is important to note that creditor rights are not an equilibrium quantity 
determined by supply and demand of credit. LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1998) show that creditor rights are largely determined by legal origin, which was 
imposed at the time of colonialism and colonization at the inception of the country. Both 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1998) and Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer 
(2007) find that laws change slowly and that there is a high degree of persistence in the 
creditor rights index over the 25-year time period between 1978-2003. Because the most 
recent data point is 2003, this is the year that is utilized in this study. This variable is an 
accurate representation of the creditor rights environment within my sample period, since 
this index is very stable. Country fixed effects are not able to be included, since there is 
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only one variable of creditor rights available for each country. Even if the creditor rights 
data were available for each year in this study, if it was unchanged, the country-level 
fixed effects would have also controlled for this effect. However, the cross-sectional 
analysis, which focuses on the interaction between creditor rights and a firm-level 
variable, does utilize country and year fixed effects, allowing me to control for any 
country-level unobservable factors. 
The majority of the previous empirical literature examines the aggregate index, 
paying little attention to the individual components. To my knowledge, there are only a 
limited number of previous papers that examine the individual components (Houston, 
Lin, Lin, and Ma, 2010; Claessens and Klapper, 2005; Bae and Goyal, 2009; and 
Acharya, Amihud, and Litov, 2011). It is important to examine the individual index 
components of the index because it is possible that only one or two elements are driving 
the findings in the previous literature that only examine the aggregate index. It’s also 
possible that the individual components have different effects on borrowers. I also 
suspect that the element of the creditor rights index that indicates whether the secured 
creditor is paid first has the strongest impact on the way creditors lend, which would 
strongly influence firm balance sheet leverage.  
Table 1 shows the individual creditor rights components for each country in the 
data set. The median firm in the sample has a creditor rights index value of about 2. Table 
1 shows that there is considerable variation in which elements of the creditor rights index 
are present in each country. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1998) show that 
creditor rights are not necessarily measures of economic development. For example, both 
France and Germany are developed economies, yet Germany has a creditor rights index 
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value of 3 and France has a creditor rights score of 0. Thus, it is unlikely that the results 
are driven by the differences in economic development.  
 
4.2 Firm-Level Variables 
The final sample consists of 1,624,761 public and private non-financial firms 
present in twenty countries from the Amadeus database for the six years between 2006 
and 2011. The initial dependent variable of interest is individual firm borrowing during a 
given year. Within the empirical framework, the supply side of the debt market consists 
of all debt issued by banks, bond holders, and any other secured or unsecured creditor. 
The ideal data would consist of information regarding each type of debt a firm has, 
including information pertaining to each bond and loan contract. Using this ideal data set, 
it would be possible to calculate the exact amount of secured debt that a firm has, its type, 
and the overall price that a firm pays to acquire this debt. Unfortunately, accounting 
standards do not require disclosure of this detail, which means it is necessary to 
approximate debt demanded and interest rates paid.  
Using Amadeus balance sheet data, it is feasible to estimate the total amount of 
borrowing ( FDebt ) that a firm holds. The two most common ways for a firm to acquire 
debt is either to obtain a loan or issue debt. Since the majority of the firms in the sample 
are small and private, most of the debt on their balance sheets is likely bank loans. The 
two components of total firm borrowing ( FDebt ) consist of non-current liabilities in 
long-term debt and current liabilities in loans. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, I do 
not have information on the specific types of debt contained within each component. 
There is no way for me to discern secured from unsecured loans or the types of bonds 
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that firms may be holding. This measure also does not account for commercial paper, 
though the majority of sample firms are small, private, and unlikely to hold commercial 
paper. This would bias the leverage estimates down, though this bias is likely negligible.  
Total borrowing is scaled by firm assets (FAssets) in order to control for any size 
effects that may supersede controlling for size alone. The dependent variable in the 
demand regressions firm-level leverage, FirmLeverage, is defined as the ratio of firm 
loans to total assets. Firms with negative equity and leverage values greater than 1 are 
removed, and the leverage variable is winsorized at the 1% level in each tail. Table 2 
shows that the average firm in the sample has $5 million in assets, $1.4 million in loans, 
and a leverage ratio of about 0.3. In contrast, the median firms has only $1 million in 
assets and under $200,000 in loans. Many of the firms in this sample are very small 
private firms, yet there are a few very large firms that skew the overall distribution.  
It is not surprising that many of the sample firms have a heavy reliance on debt, 
since the sample consists almost entirely of private firms that cannot easily access equity 
markets (Berger and Udell, 1998) and depend primarily on funding from commercial 
banks along with the equity of the principle owner (Berger and Udell, 2002). However, 
each of these variables is very right skewed.3 There are a few firms in each country that 
are very large, which is what drives the skewness of many variables. The heterogeneity 
within this sample provides ample opportunities for analysis. The summary statistics are 
shown in Table 2. 
                                                 
3 Robustness checks completed in Section 7 will show that even after accounting for this 
skewness, the results are still unchanged. 
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When a borrower is determining the amount debt to acquire, one of the most 
important factors will be the price of the loan or interest rate. If the data allowed, it would 
be best to use individual debt contracts in order to estimate the average cost that each 
firm could acquire additional debt. Instead, the existing data can only create a proxy for 
how much it would cost an individual firm to acquire additional capital. I call this 
variable the firm-level interest rate, IRCorp. Using the Amadeus Database, I obtain 
information on the total interest the firm has paid, which is paid on both loans and bonds. 
The estimated firm-level interest rate is calculated by taking the ratio of the total interest 
the firm has paid, InterestPaid, to total debt, FDebt .  
The Dealscan database contains loan-level data for a cross section of syndicated 
commercial loans that are a minimum of $100,000. Loans of this size would be 
unobtainable for many of the firms in the sample, considering $100,000 is more than the 
total loans that 40% of the sample firms have on their balance sheets. This study is 
motivated by the idea that it is important to examine firms of all types, including small 
firms that are most likely affected by the local creditor rights environments. Bae and 
Goyal (2009) examine loan-level data from the DealScan database and find no 
relationship between creditor rights and loan size or maturity, but they do find that 
greater investor rights lead to lower interest rates. I acknowledge this data limitation but 
realize that this is a tradeoff where I compromise loan-level details from the Dealscan for 
a much wider range of firms that vary substantially in terms of size, countries, and 
sample composition. 
This interest rate is subject to a number of problems, such as the different 
accounting standards that countries may have, differences in collateral, and underwriting. 
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Additionally, it is impossible to determine the rates paid on bonds or even the types of 
loans that firms are holding. Though this interest rate is subject to a variety of problems 
and biases, I believe that when considering firm financing and investment decisions, the 
firm-level interest rate is an important variable that has previously been omitted by many 
previous leverage studies. I expect this interest rate to have a highly significant negative 
relationship with FirmLeverage, indicating that firms borrow more when interest rates are 
lower. Firm-level interest rates that are either less than 0 or greater than 1 are truncated, 
and the distribution is winsorized at the 1% level. I find that the median firm in the 
sample is able to obtain a loan at about 5.4%, though the average is almost twice as high, 
which is due to the fact that many of the firms within this sample are small and operating 
in emerging market countries. This rate is especially high for private firms in Ukraine, 
Slovak Republic, and the Czech Republic. 
In subsequent regressions, I analyze the way firms utilize the additional capital 
that they demand outside bankruptcy states. For the investment analysis, the dependent 
variables of interest are Investment, Risk, and Profitability. Investment is defined as the 
annual increase in gross fixed assets scaled by total assets in the beginning of the year 
(Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2009; Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist, 2015 and 
Badertscher, Shroff, and White, 2013). Because net assets are reported on the balance 
sheet, I calculate the change in gross assets by computing the difference between net 
fixed assets and adding incremental depreciation. I scale this measure by total assets to 
arrive at the proxy for investment. Unfortunately, a number of firms in this sample do not 
report incremental depreciation, which means I lose several firm-year observations, as 
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can be seen by the Table 2 summary statistics. The average firm in the sample has an 
investment ratio of 5%, while the median firm is at 1.9%.  
This measure of investment is subject to a number of additional criticisms that 
should be acknowledged. Both capital expenditures and mergers and acquisitions lead to 
increases in fixed assets, though research and development does not. As previously 
mentioned, many European countries are not required to disclose research and 
development on their balance sheets, which is a limitation of this measure. Existing 
studies examining investment policies of private firms similarly examine changes in 
gross fixed assets. The proxy for profitability is measured as earnings before depreciation 
and taxes normalized by total assets, EBITDA/FAssets. I also examine a three-year 
estimate of firm cash-flow risk, Risk, which is defined as the standard deviation of 
EBITDA/FAssets for the year before, during, and after the year of analysis. I also conduct 
robustness checks analyzing the standard deviation of the previous three years, as in 
Faccio, Marchica, and Mura (2011). Because this metric for risk examines three years of 
data, firms without 2005 data are unable to compute risk measurements. This is the 
reason a small group of firm-year observations are dropped from the sample when 
examining firm risk. 
In each regressions, I also control for a subset of firm-level characteristics, which 
are primarily taken from by Myers (1977) and Boot, Aivazian, Demirg̈uç-Kunt, and 
Maksimovic (2001). These firm-level controls include total firm assets (in log form), 
LogFAssets, in order to control for any size effects. The variable TanAssets measures the 
percentage of total assets that are recorded as fixed assets, which proxies for collateral. 
The average firm in the sample has 25% of its assets listed as tangible, while the median 
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firm has about 16%. Tobin's Q, which is the ratio of the market value of the firm's total 
assets to its book value, is typically an indicator of investment opportunity, but given that 
99% of firms in the sample are privately held, it is not possible to compute a market 
value. As a result, I proxy for investment opportunities by defining a variable, Growth, 
that is computed by examining the natural log of the increase in sales growth.  
The finance literature examining private companies commonly proxies for 
investment opportunities in this way (Shin and Stulz, 1998; Lehn and Poulsen, 1989; 
Whited, 2006; Whited and Wu, 2006; Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen, 2007; Asker, 
Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist, 2015 and Badertscher, Shroff, and White, 2013). I also 
examine firm age, Age, as defined as the amount of years since incorporation in order to 
proxy for firm reputation. Diamond (1991) shows that firm reputation can affect 
financing choices when the firm becomes sufficiently mature to be able to access the 
bond market. The average firm age in the sample is 15 years, while the median firm is 12 
years old, indicating that most firms in the sample are quite established and are not start-
ups. All firm-level control variables are winsorized at the 1% level, except ROA and 
Growth which are winsorized at 5% to curtail the skewness and outlier influence. In total 
there are a total of 4,656,320 firm-years in the sample spanning twenty countries. 
 
4.3 Country-Level Controls 
A selection of macro-level controls is included for all firm-level regressions that 
are designed to control for the macro lending environment. These country-level variables 
attempt to control for differences in economic development across countries, and they are 
shown in Panel B of Table 2. When deciding how much debt a firm demands, it may 
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consider the ease of pursuing a debt substitute, such as going to the equity market. Large 
public firms, in particular, have greater access to domestic bond markets, as well as the 
international bond market. This may be an attractive substitute for bank debt, if the bond 
markets are well developed and easily accessible. The Bankscope database by Bureau 
Van Dijk contains balance sheet data for almost every public and private bank within a 
given country. This database is extremely comprehensive and contains data for banks for 
each country within the Amadeus sample. I use this database in order to obtain the total 
number of bank loans within a given country for each year of the analysis. By 
aggregating the individual bank data contained within Bankscope, I am able to estimate 
total size of bank loans within a country, TotalBankLoans. In order to estimate the size of 
the bond market, I obtain data on the aggregate size of the bond market for non-financial 
firms, BondMarket, from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The control of the 
bond market in country c during year t is computed below.  
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑐,𝑡 =
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑐,𝑡
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑐,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑐,𝑡
 
The variable BondControl should capture the substitutability of bank loans with 
the bond market. I expect the relationship between firm leverage and the size of the bond 
market to be negative, which means that countries that have greater access to the bond 
market should take on less bank loans. The variable BondControl is also skewed to the 
right. The average value of BondControl is about 0.12, though the median is only 0.04. 
The skewness comes from the fact that a number of countries in the sample have more 
developed bond markets, while many of the emerging market countries in the sample do 
not. Furthermore, I control for the level of information sharing in an economy, which 
may alleviate financing constraints, foster credit market expansion, and act as a substitute 
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for creditor rights (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; Padilla and Pagano, 2002; Djankov, 
McLiesh, and Schleifer, 2007; and Brown, Jappelli, Pagano, 2009).  
Information sharing measures the degree of efficient contracting between 
borrowers and lenders and is an indication of how much banks know about borrowers. It 
has also been shown that if banks exchange information about borrowers, this can 
influence borrower behavior by motivating them to exert more effort into projects 
(Padilla and Pagano, 2000 and Vercammen, 1995) and pay back loans (Klein, 1992). The 
proxy for information sharing is from the World Bank. The variable Depth measures the 
depth of information sharing for a country during a given year. It is an index taking on a 
value between 1 and 6, where higher values indicate the availability of more credit 
information from either a public registry or a private bureau. The variable depth is 
available annually for all years in the sample, and the six components of the index Depth 
are discussed in detail in Appendix A.4.  
Information sharing may act as a reward or punishment for borrowers. The 
spreading of knowledge regarding something like consistent payments may serve as a 
positive signal, while numerous delinquencies may make it more difficult for the firm to 
obtain future credit. Information sharing has been shown to be an important determinant 
of credit availability by a number of theory (Padilla and Pagano, 1997; Padilla and 
Pagano, 2000; Pagano and Jappelli, 1993; Boyd and Hakenes, 2013) and empirical papers 
(Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; Djankov, McLiesh, Shleifer, 2007; Laeven, Levine, 
Michalopoulos, 2015; Brown, Jappelli and Pagano, 2009). 
A number of papers also suggest that it’s not just the rules that are in place but the 
way that they are enforced that determines their implications (Bae and Goyal; 2009 and 
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Bhattacharya and Daouk; 2002, 2005), which means it is necessary to control for the 
degree of enforcement within each country. Later, socialist countries are dropped entirely 
in robustness checks, since their enforcement is most questionable, which will be 
discussed in Section 7 of this paper. From the World Governance Indicators (compiled by 
Kaufmann, Kray, and Mastruzzi, 2008), at the country-year level, variables to control for 
control for control of corruption ( Corruption ), government effectiveness ( Effectiveness 
), quality of regulation ( Regulation ), and rule of law ( Law ), and political stability ( 
Stability ) to capture government stability, are included. These variables designed to 
control for the degree of law enforcement that is in place and are explained in detail in 
Appendix A.4.  
I also control for economic development by controlling for log Real GDP Per 
Capita (LogGDP) to capture the size of the economy, inflation (Inflation) , and create 
dummy variables for French (French), German (German), Scandinavian (Scan), and 
Socialist (Socialist) legal origin. Further details regarding country-level controls can be 
found in Appendix A.4. Panel B of Table 2 shows all of the country-level variables 
discussed in this section. There are ninety-six country-year observations present in the 
final sample, and each macro variable is winsorized at the 1% level and lagged by one 
year in analysis.  
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5 Firm Leverage Regression Results 
5.1 Firm Leverage Ordinary Least Squares Results 
The first step in the analysis is to use an ordinary least squares approach in order 
to examine the overall effect that creditor rights have on firm leverage. The main 
dependent variable is firm leverage, which is the ratio of firm-level total liabilities in 
loans and long-term debt to total assets. The key independent variables of interest are the 
interest rate and creditor rights measures. Both firm-level controls and macro-level 
controls are included in the regressions. The construction of each variable is contained 
within Section 4, and the ordinary least squares regression takes the form: 
 
I analyze the aggregate creditor rights index as proposed by La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer (1998) and Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer (2007), as well as the 
individual components. I also include industry-year fixed effects, and robust standard 
errors are clustered at the country-level year level. By clustering the errors at the country-
year, firms are not restricted to be independent within country-years. However, 
observations are required to be independent across country-years.  
Unfortunately, I am unable to include country-level or firm-level fixed effects 
because the creditor rights measures are from 2003, which is the most recent year of the 
data provided by Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer (2007), while the earliest year of firm-
level data I analyze is 2006. As previously discussed, creditor rights are very constant 
over time and are likely to accurately estimate the degree of investor protection during 
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the sample period. If creditor rights negatively affect borrowing, this would indicate that 
𝛽2' <0, though 𝛽2'>0 would indicate a positive relationship between leverage and 
borrowing. The results of the firm-level ordinary least squares results for the full sample 
are presented in Table 3. 
The regression results show that the firm-level interest rate, IRCorp, is negative 
and significant, indicating that firms borrow more when interest rates are lower, and the 
magnitude is consistent across each of the four components of the creditor rights index. 
As shown by regression 1, the aggregate index, Crights, is associated with an increase in 
firm leverage. Only two of the individual creditor rights index components appear 
significant in the regressions. All else equal, this means that for two similar firm, 
operating in two economies where the creditor rights index differs by one unit, the firm in 
the environment with higher creditor rights will have a leverage ratio that is .0260 higher 
than the other. For the average firm in the sample, with a leverage ratio of .296, a similar 
firm in an environment with one unit more of investor protection would have a leverage 
ratio of .296+.0260 = .322, which is an increase in leverage of approximately 8.78%. 
When there is no automatic stay of assets (NoAutostay) present that increase firm-level 
leverage by 0.044. For the average firm in the sample, this is associated with a 14.8% 
increase in leverage, while if the secured creditor is paid first (Secured), this leads to an 
increase in firm leverage by about 25% for the average firm. The magnitude of these 
coefficients indicate that when these specific elements of the creditor rights index are 
present, it is much easier for firms to obtain credit, as evidenced by increased leverage. 
The significance and magnitude of the creditor rights coefficients indicate that the effects 
are economically large and meaningful. 
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When creditors have to approve reorganization (Reorg) or have the ability to 
remove management (Manages), there is no significant effect on firm leverage. The 
positive and significant effect on leverage from the creditor rights index is in line with the 
findings of Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano (2009) and Giannetti (2003) but contradict those 
of Acharya, Amihud, and Litov (2011) and Acharya and Subramanian (2009). The 
coefficients on firm-level and macro controls exhibit the expected signs that are 
consistent with the established finance literature, which are discussed below.  
The firm-level controls show that  
1. Firm size, LogFAssets, is positive and significant, indicating that larger firms may be 
slightly more levered than small firms, though the magnitude on this coefficient is 
extremely small. Firm size has generally found to be negatively correlated with 
leverage in previous studies, with the exception of Rajan and Zingales (1995) and 
Giannetti (2003) who find some evidence of a positive relationship in certain 
countries within their studies.  
2. Sales growth, Growth, is not shown to be a significant predictor of firm leverage. 
3. Profitability, ROA, always appears negatively correlated with firm leverage, which is 
consistent with the existing finance literature, suggesting that firms would rather 
finance with internal funds rather than debt (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995 and Boot, Aivazian, Demirg̈uç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2001).  
4. Tangible assets, TanAssets, is positive and significant, as the literature suggests 
(Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995 and Giannetti, 2003). Tangible 
assets represent the amount of collateral a firm can offer. When firms can offer more 
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as collateral, creditors are more willing to supply them with debt. Borrowers may also 
demand more loans as a result.  
5. The proxy for firm reputation, Age, appears negative and significant, yet the 
magnitude is very small. Diamond (1991) suggests that firm reputation will affect 
firm financing decisions once the firm matures and gains access to the bond market, 
though the paper suggests a nonlinear relationship. 
The country-level controls indicate:  
1. The proxy for substitutability of the bond market, BondControl, is negative and 
significant, indicating that for countries where the bond market is larger, firms are 
less levered.  
2. Depth of information sharing, Depth, is shown to be positively associated with firm 
leverage, which is consistent with the literature suggesting information sharing 
alleviates financing constraints (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; Padilla and Pagano, 2002; 
Djankov, McLiesh, and Schleifer, 2007; and Brown, Jappelli, Pagano, 2009). 
3. Economic development, LogGDP, when significant is negative and has a very small 
magnitude, though it is only negative at the 10% significance level when examining 
the aggregate creditor rights measure in regression 1. 
4. The variable Inflation does not enter the regressions significantly 
5. Rule enforcement, including Corruption, Effectiveness, Regulation, and Law, do not 
appear to influence leverage very much. In some regression specifications, they are 
significant and are positively associated with firm leverage, indicating firms borrow 
more when enforcement is greater.  
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6. Political Stability, Stability, is shown to be positively associated with firm leverage 
for regressions 1 and 3, indicating that firms borrow more when they are in 
environments that are more politically stable. However, the opposite effect is true in 
regression 4 at the 10% significance level. 
 
5.2 Further Leverage Analysis 
Next, I analyze the way creditor rights affect the leverage of specific cross-
sections of firms. When creditor rights are higher, creditors may be more likely to extend 
credit to to firms that could not easily acquire it. Specifically, I test whether or not firms 
with low levels of assets or firms that can post less collateral are able to obtain more 
loans.  
First, I focus on firms that have a high percentage of tangible assets that could be 
used as collateral. I examine if these firms are able to obtain more loans in higher creditor 
rights environments by focusing on the interaction between the creditor rights measure 
and asset tangibility. By examining this interaction term, I am able to include country 
fixed effects, allowing me to control for any unobservable country-level characteristics 
that are unchanged within my sample period. The regression framework is outlined in 
equation 2:  
All of the firm-level controls from Table 3 are included within the regressions, including 
asset tangibility. Beyond controlling for the effect that asset tangibility has on leverage, 
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the interaction term between asset tangibility and creditor rights indicates any additional 
effects that creditor rights have on firm leverage through asset tangibility. Because the 
asset tangibility variable represents the percentage of total firm assets that are considered 
tangible, if firms that cannot pledge as much collateral are able to obtain more loans, this 
would indicate that 𝛽5′  <0 . Alternatively, if it is found that 𝛽5′   <0, this could also mean 
that firms with more tangible assets are reducing leverage as a risk reduction technique. 
In Section 6, I will examine an alternate risk-taking measures and see if these results are 
consistent with a risk-reduction story. The results are presented in Panel A of Table 4. 
Only the coefficients on the interaction terms between creditor rights and asset tangibility 
are reported for the sake of space, though the other controls are quantitatively similar to 
the OLS results presented in Table 3.  
Table 4 indicates that firms with more tangible assets reduce leverage when the 
aggregate creditor rights index is higher, and this finding is driven by the components 
associated with restrictions on reorganization or management removal. The average firm 
in the sample has an asset tangibility of 0.253 and a leverage ratio of 0.293. Table 4 
indicates that when the aggregate creditor rights index increases by one unit, the average 
firm in the sample has a decrease in leverage of 0.0811 × 0.253 = 0.0203, which is 
approximately a 7% drop in leverage. The interaction terms between tangibility and 
either no automatic stay on assets or secured creditor paid first do not significantly impact 
leverage. 
Next, I analyze whether small firms are able to obtain more loans when creditor 
rights are higher or if larger firms are capable of additional borrowing. I examine the 
interaction between the creditor rights variable and log lagged assets. I control for all 
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firm-level variables presented in Table 3, including log lagged assets. The regression 
framework is presented in equation 3: 
 
Table 4 Panel B shows the results of Equation 3 for each creditor rights variable. 
The average firm in the sample has log assets of 13.948 and leverage of 0.296. Table 5 
Panel B indicates that the when the aggregate creditor rights index, restrictions on 
reorganization, or management removal components of the creditor rights index interact 
with firm size, this has a positive effect on firm leverage. For the aggregate creditor rights 
index, this means that all else equal, for two equally sized firms existing in economies 
where the creditor rights index differs by one unit, this is associated with a difference in 
leverage of 0.0057, suggesting that on average, larger firms are able to obtain more credit 
in debtor friendly economies. For the average firm in the sample, with log assets of 
13.948, that is a difference of 13.948 × 0.0057 = 0.0795. Interestingly, the coefficient on 
the interaction between Secured and LogFAssets is negative and significant, indicating 
that smaller firms borrow more when the secured creditor is paid first. This suggests that 
secured creditors are more likely to give small firms credit, if they have priority over 
employees or government workers. The interaction term between size and no automatic 
stay of assets does not have a significant effect on firm leverage.  
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6 Firm Investment Policy 
6.1 Firm Investment 
If higher creditor rights lead to greater borrowing, as evidenced by increased 
leverage, the next question to consider is how firms are utilizing the additional capital 
that they acquire. I first test whether higher creditor rights leads to increased firm 
investment.  
Most investment literature defines investment as capital expenditures, mergers 
and acquisitions, and research and development. However, due to the nature of the 
Amadeus Database, it is difficult to distinguish between these types of investment, and 
the majority of firms in the sample do not report research and development expenditure, 
either because they do not have this type of expenditure or because the country 
accounting standards do not require it. As in Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2015), 
the variable Investment is defined as the annual increase in gross fixed assets divided by 
total assets at the beginning of the year. Also, as discussed in Section 4.2, a number of 
firms in the final sample do not report incremental depreciation.  
As a result, a group of firm-year observations are lost, resulting in a reduced 
sample, though the country composition has not changed. Both capital expenditure and 
mergers and acquisitions activities will lead to increases in the variable Investment , 
though increases in research and development is not contained within this variable due to 
the limitations of the Amadeus database. In order to test the second hypothesis, that 
creditor rights are associated with greater firm investment, the following regression 
presented in Equation 4 is examined: 
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Within this investment framework, the variable of interest for hypothesis 2 is 𝛽9′   
. If firms are taking the additional capital that they borrow and investing it, I expect 𝛽9′  
>0 . I control for a variety of lagged firm-level controls that have been established by the 
finance literature as important determinants for investment. These firm-level and country-
level controls are similar to those utilized in the leverage regressions, but lagged leverage 
is added as a control.  
Leverage has shown to be an important determinant for investment because firms with 
lower leverage can more easily engage in investment opportunity improvement. I also 
control for greater investment opportunity sets as proxied by sales growth (Growth). 
Firms that are more profitable (ROA), larger (LogFAssets), have more tangible assets 
(TanAssets), or are more reputable (Age) are more likely to have fewer financing 
constraints, which should positively affect firm investment. Firms that have lower costs 
of obtaining credit, as estimated by IRCorp, are also more likely to be able to take 
advantage of investment opportunities. At the country-level, I control for the level of 
information sharing (Depth) , which is believed to help alleviate financial constraints, 
economic development (LogGDP), inflation ( Inflation) enforcement (Corruption, 
Effectiveness, Regulation, Law), as well as political stability ( Stability), substitutability 
of the bond market (BondControl) and legal origin. The results are presented in Table 5.  
I find that Secured is the only component of the creditor rights that impacts firm 
investment, though the significance is only at the 10% level. The leverage analysis had 
indicated that Secured was the most important determinant of firm borrowing, and Table 
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5 provides evidence that at least some of this money is invested in tangible assets. In 
Section 5, it was shown that firms with lower levels of asset tangibility had greater 
leverage when creditors could approve restrictions on reorganization or remove firm 
management, which drove the significance of the creditor rights index.  
Equation 5 tests whether the interaction between creditor rights and asset 
tangibility significantly impacts firm investment. If this interaction significantly impacts 
firm leverage, it could be possible that part of the additional capital acquired is being 
used to grow the firm's business.  
Section 5 also indicates that the interaction effect between creditor rights and firm size is 
positive if restrictions on reorganization, the ability to remove management, or the 
aggregate index is examined. However, if the secured creditor is paid first, the interaction 
effect with creditor rights is negative, indicating that smaller firms are more levered. 
Equation 6 examines whether the interaction between creditor rights and firm size to 
determine if the firms that obtain more credit are investing in tangible assets.  
 
The regression results of Equations 5 and 6 are presented in Table 6, and robust 
stand errors are clustered at the country-year level. Firm-level controls are quantitatively 
similar to those in Table 5 but are not reported for the sake of space.  
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Table 6 Panel A suggests that the interaction between tangible assets and any of 
the creditor rights measures does not significantly impact firm investment decisions. 
Even if firms with low levels of asset tangibility are able to acquire more credit, they do 
not have increased investment in tangible assets. Interestingly, Table 6 Panel B indicates 
that the interaction term between asset tangibility and whether the secured creditor is paid 
first is the only element of the creditor rights index that negatively impacts firm 
investment.  
Table 4 Panel B indicated that small firms were able to borrow more when 
secured creditors are paid first, and Table 7 Panel B indicates that smaller firms invest 
more when this element is present. These two results suggest that when the secured 
creditor is paid first, smaller firms are able to borrow more, and some of this money is 
invested in tangible assets.  
 
6.2 Creditor Rights and Firm Risk 
This study next examines the types of projects that firms are engaging in by 
examining overall firm cash-flow risk. There are two conflicting hypothesis regarding the 
way that creditor protection impacts these two variables. Acharya, Amihud, and Litov 
(2011) suggest that when creditor rights are high, firms fear inefficient liquidation and 
engage in projects to decrease their overall firm risk, even if these projects are 
unprofitable. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that when equity holders have smaller 
claims in bankruptcy, they take on projects that have higher variances and lower mean 
returns, which translates to more risk and less profitability overall. 
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The measure of firm risk is defined as the standard deviation of 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑓,𝑐,𝑡−1, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑓,𝑐,𝑡, 
and𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑓,𝑐,𝑡+1, though the results are robust to using the previous three years of return on 
assets as well. A small number of firms in the sample do not have the data from 2005 
necessary to compute the measure of firm risk necessary for 2006, which is the first year 
of the study. As a result, the sample for this analysis is slightly reduced, though this 
reduction should not affect the results, as the firms without data available come from a 
variety of different countries.  
First, I analyze the overall relationship between creditor rights and firm risk. I use 
industry-year fixed effects, and robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. 
The framework presented in equation 7 is used to gain an overall impression of the way 
investor protection impacts firm cash-flow risk. 
 
If creditor rights leads to higher firm risk, as in Jensen and Meckling (1976), it 
can be expected that 𝛽16′  >0. The agency conflict mentioned in Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) is most closely related to the component of the creditor rights index that indicates 
whether or not secured creditors are paid first ( Secured ), since in some countries, 
employees can actually rank higher than secured creditors.  
Many of the firms in the sample are small private firms that are owned and 
operated by the same small group of individuals. If a firm goes bankrupt in an 
environment where the secured creditor is paid first, the employees (or government) 
retain a smaller percentage of the firm, which is directly related to the agency conflict 
presented in Jensen and Meckling (1976). If employees are paid first out of liquidation 
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claims, the owners are able to retain a greater portion of the firm and the downside losses 
of the equity holders are less substantial. All else equal, it is more likely for equity 
holders to want to continue firm operations, while secured creditors may be more eager to 
collect their claims.  
The firm-level and country-level controls are identical to those used for the 
investment regressions. I control for ROA because risk, as measured by the volatility of 
ROA, could potentially stem from poor management ability, opposed to risk-taking 
choices, as mentioned by Faccio, Marchica, and Mura (2011). I also expect to see 
negative relationships between firm risk-taking and firm leverage (Leverage), as more 
debt results in greater equity risk. I also expect negative coefficients on size 
(LogFAssets), and reputation proxied by age ( Age) , and tangibility (TanAssets) . I also 
control for firm-level interest rate (IRCorp) and investment opportunity (Growth). The 
country-level controls include (LogGDP), the size of the bond market (BondMarket), 
enforcement (Corruption, Effectiveness, Regulation, and Law), political stability 
(Stability), and legal origin. Full sample are presented in Table 7.  
The results presented in Table 7 show that the only element of the creditor rights 
index that has an impact on corporate risk-taking is whether the secured creditor is paid 
first. When the secured creditor is paid first, corporate cash-flow risk increases, and this 
finding is what drives the positive sign on the aggregate index. This finding suggests that 
overall, firms respond to investor protection by risk-shifting. The control coefficients all 
have the predicted signs. Size, leverage, asset tangibility, and growth opportunities all 
negatively impact firm risk, while the interest rate has a positive effect. Firm age and 
profitability are not significantly related to firm cash-flow risk.  
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The agency conflicts between debt and equity holders are most severe for two 
particular groups of firms that will be examined separately. Creditors may be more likely 
to liquidate a firm when they control a large proportion of the firm, such as when the firm 
is highly levered, or when they can retrieve a large amount of claims, such as when the 
firm has a large proportion of tangible assets. If firms do fear inefficient asset liquidation, 
it can be expected that firms that are highly levered or have high levels of asset tangibility 
to reduce risk-taking when creditor rights are greater. However, it could also be the case 
that increased creditor rights cause equity holders to even take more risks, since they 
have more to lose when creditor rights are stronger. The former supports Acharya, 
Amihud, and Litov (2011), while the latter is consistent Jensen and Meckling (1976).  
I test the risk-reducing hypothesis more closely by examining the cross-sectional 
variation within the sample. In order to test the risk-reducing hypothesis, I focus on a 
group of firms that is most likely to fear inefficient liquidation. As discussed in Section 
5.2, firms that are primarily invested in tangible assets that can easily be sold that operate 
in economies with high levels of investor protection are most likely to fear inefficient 
liquidation. Creditors may be more likely to liquidate a firm if they can retrieve a large 
portion of their claim by selling assets or if they have more control over the bankruptcy 
and liquidation process. As a result, these firms may ex ante reduce risk-taking initiatives.  
In equation 8, I directly test the risk-reduction hypothesis of Acharya, Amihud, 
and Litov (2011). I expect that firms with high levels of tangibility fear inefficient 
liquidation in environments where creditor rights are strong, indicating 𝛽19'<0. 
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The firm-level cash-flow controls for Table 8 Panel A are quantitatively similar to 
those reported in Table 7, including the negative relationship with asset tangibility, but 
are unreported. Table 8 Panel A shows that the interaction between the aggregate creditor 
rights index and tangibility is negative and significant, indicating that when creditor 
rights are higher, firms with greater levels of asset tangibility do reduce risk. The 
aggregate creditor rights index is driven by whether the secured creditor is paid first and 
if there is no automatic stay of assets present.  
The leverage results presented in Table 4 Panel A show that the interaction 
between creditor rights and asset tangibility impacts leverage negatively only when 
restrictions on reorganization and management removal are examined. If firms with high 
levels of tangible assets in high creditor rights environments were using leverage as a 
risk-reduction technique, I would these same interaction terms to negatively enter the 
regressions in Table 8 Panel A. I find that the direction of the overall interactions is 
significant, but the creditor rights index components have different effects.  
By examining Table 4 Panel A and Table 8 Panel A together, the empirical results 
in Table 4 Panel A suggest that firms with lower asset tangibility are able to acquire more 
loans when restrictions on reorganization or management removal is present, not that 
larger firms are reducing leverage as a risk-reducing technique, since the two components 
mentioned do not significantly suggest reductions in cash-flow risk. Only examining the 
aggregate creditor rights index would have suggested that reduced leverage was 
consistent with a risk-reduction story in both tables, yet that is not the case when I 
examine the individual components that drive the index.  
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Next, I empirically test if creditor rights influence firm risk-taking in a manner 
that is consistent with the risk-shifting literature. I focus on firms where the agency 
conflict between debt and equity holders is already severe. When firms are highly 
levered, debt holders hold large firm claims, but equity holders manage the firm and may 
have incentives to take additional risk, as suggested by the risk-shifting literature.  
Equation 9 tests whether creditor rights amplify the agency conflict between debt 
and equity holders. I examine whether firms with high leverage values that exist in 
economies with high creditor rights are more likely to pursue risky projects, as indicated 
by 𝛽21'>0.. The results are presented in Table 8 Panel A. 
 
The firm-level cash-flow risk controls, including a negative sign on firm leverage, 
are quantitatively similar to those in Table 7 but are unreported. Table 8 Panel B indicates 
that firms that are already highly levered take on additional risks when any element of the 
creditor rights index is higher. Adler (1982) suggests that firms that are approaching 
bankruptcy respond to higher creditor rights by increasing risk, which is consistent with 
the story told by Jensen and Meckling (1976).  
It is possible that the firm chooses leverage and risk together. To alleviate some of 
this endogeneity problem, I examine lagged leverage, though this doesn't perfectly solve 
the problem of the two variables being jointly determined. However, high leverage is a 
strong indication of financial distress, which is why it is examined in Equation 9. Table 8 
Panel B shows that the interaction effect between each creditor rights and firm leverage 
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positively impacts cash-flow risk. This is consistent with the idea that creditor rights 
make the agency conflict between debt and equity holders more pronounced. 
6.3 Creditor Rights and Firm Profitability 
Acharya, Amihud, and Litov (2011) find that when creditor rights are high, firms 
engage in diversifying acquisitions, even if they are unprofitable, as evidenced by 
announcement returns. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that as the agency conflict 
between debt and equity holders gets more severe, firms engage in riskier projects with 
lower overall mean returns. Both hypotheses suggest that creditor rights should 
negatively impact firm profitability. I use the following regression framework to 
understand the overall relationship between creditor rights and firm profitability, and the 
regression analysis below is are presented in Table 9. 
 
Industry-year fixed effects are included, and robust standard errors are clustered at 
the country level. The firm-level and country-level controls are identical to those used in 
Tables 5 and 7. Table 10 shows that each of the creditor rights measures, except Reorg, is 
associated with a decrease in firm profitability. I find that the interest rate, asset 
tangibility, and leverage are positively related to firm profitability, while growth 
opportunities and reputation have a negative impact. When no automatic stay of assets is 
in place, this is associated with the most dramatic decrease in profitability.  
Table 7 indicated that when the secured creditor was paid first, this leads to an 
increase in risk, while Table 9 shows that this element of the index is associated with a 
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small decrease in profitability. Though, no automatic stay of assets and management 
removal did not have significant effects on firm risk-taking in Table 8, they do 
significantly reduce firm profitability.  
Next, I examine the effect creditor rights have on firms that either have high 
liquidation values or are highly levered. Again, I am able to use country and year fixed 
effects, and robust standard errors are clustered by country year. I control for tangibility, 
leverage, and all firm characteristics from Table 9.  
In Table 4 Panel A, I found that the interaction between asset tangibility and the 
creditor rights index, restrictions on reorganization, or management removal all 
negatively impacted firm leverage. That is, firms with lower asset tangibility were able to 
acquire more loans when these creditor rights existed in the economy. In equation 11, I 
attempt to understand whether or not the result of this additional credit lead to those firms 
being more profitable. The results of equation 11 are presented in Table 10 Panel A.  
 
The controls in Table 10 Panel A are quantitatively similar those presented in 
Table 9, including the positive sign on tangible assets, but are unreported. Table 10 Panel 
A indicates that even after controlling for asset tangibility, the interaction between 
tangibility and creditor rights significantly impacts firm profitability when the aggregate 
index, restrictions on reorganization, or management removal are examined. These are 
the same interaction terms that were shown to impact leverage in Table 4 Panel A.  
Examining Table 4 Panel A and Table 10 Panel A together indicates that not only 
are firms with lower tangibility are able to borrow more when these two components of 
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the creditor rights index are present, and that these projects lead to higher overall 
profitability overall. The interaction effects between asset tangibility and either no 
automatic stay of assets or whether the secured creditor is paid first do not impact firm 
leverage or profitability. 
In Table 8 Panel A it was shown that firms who have high levels of asset 
tangibility reduce risk when no automatic stay of assets is present or the secured creditor 
is paid first. Table 10 Panel A shows that the interaction between asset tangibility and 
either of the elements that was shown the reduce risk-taking ( NoAutostay or Secured) 
does not lead to lower profitability. Thus, firms with high levels of tangible assets may be 
reducing overall firm risk when these elements are present, but they are not necessarily 
taking on unprofitable projects in order to reduce risk. However, firms with higher levels 
of tangible assets do realize lower profits when any of the other creditor rights elements 
are present.  
Next, I examine whether highly levered firms that exist in investor-friendly 
environments realize greater levels of profitability by examining Equation 12. Again, the 
firm-level controls are quantitatively similar to those presented in Table 9 but are 
unreported. 
 
Table 8 Panel B indicated that firms that are highly levered increase firm risk when 
creditor rights are higher. This finding is significant for all elements of the creditor rights 
index, which is in line with Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Adler (1982). Table 10 
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Panel B presents evidence that creditor rights emphasize the agency conflict between debt 
and equity holders.  
Table 8 Panel B and Table 10 Panel B suggest that the all interactions between firm 
leverage and each element of the creditor rights index leads to more cash-flow risk and 
lower returns for firms that are approaching bankruptcy, which is consistent with the risk-
shifting literature. 
 
 
7. Instrumental Variable Analysis 
In this next section, I further analyze the impact creditor rights have on firm 
leverage by using an instrumental variable framework. When examining the determinants 
of firm leverage, the firm-level interest rate is included as a control variable, since the 
amount that firms pay for debt is an important determinant of leverage. The debt 
quantities and interest rates examined are equilibrium quantities, which are functions of 
both supply and demand forces.  
Examining the relationship between borrowing and the cost of debt is prone to the 
problems pertaining to simultaneous equations, and the OLS coefficient estimates for the 
interest rate will be biased. Furthermore, OLS estimates on all controls correlated with 
the endogenous variable will also be biased. However, the other firm-level and country-
level controls that are not correlated with the interest rate are all consistently estimated. 
Creditor rights are also not equilibrium quantities and were imposed at the time of 
legal origin. However, they are an important determinant of the firm-level interest rates. 
When creditor rights are higher, there is some evidence that banks charge lower interest 
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rates (Qian and Strahan, 2007), suggesting that the correlation between creditor rights and 
the firm interest are is non-zero. However, it is also possible that creditors lend to a 
riskier pool of investors and raise interest rates in response to the increased risk. Thus, it 
could be the case that interest rates increase. If creditor rights affect interest rates, 
borrowers may also adjust their leverage decisions in response to these changes in 
interest rates.  
For example, if higher investor protection leads to lower interest rates being 
charged, firms may respond to lower interest rates by taking on additional debt. The OLS 
coefficients on creditor rights will not capture any effect on lending that indirectly arise 
from changes in interest rates. If the creditor rights element does not influence interest 
rates, then the creditor rights OLS coefficients should indicate the full effects of creditor 
rights on firm leverage. In order to understand the complete impact that creditor rights 
have on firm leverage, it is necessary to use an instrumental variable approach and 
correct the bias of the OLS estimates. 
 
7.1 Instrument Identification and Motivation 
In order to construct an instrumental variable framework, it is necessary to first 
identify an instrument will exogenously shift the supply curve, allowing me to trace out a 
demand curve. This instrument must be relevant, exogenous, and only affect firm demand 
for loans through its effect on the firm-level interest rate. The instrument examined is the 
level of bank concentration. There are two conflicting hypotheses regarding the way 
concentration impacts loan rates.  
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The “efficient structure hypothesis” suggests that concentration within the banking 
industry is due to more efficient banks taking over less efficient ones (Demsetz, 1973; 
Peltzman, 1977). Diamond (1984) and Boyd and Prescott (1986) suggest that scale 
economies may drive banking to a monopolistic structure and that concentration is a 
result of scale economies. As a result, loan rates charged and deposit rates paid would be 
more competitive, resulting from the efficiency gains being passed to the consumers. This 
argument assumes firm-specific efficiencies as exogenous and ultimately, these firm-
specific efficiencies are what lead to higher levels of concentration. This means that 
markets that exhibit higher than average concentrations are due to the fact that the most 
efficient firms have the highest market shares, not chance or a random event.  
An alternative theory, commonly referred to as the “structure performance 
hypothesis,” suggests that when there is more concentration within the banking industry, 
banks will collude and use their market power to extract rents, which can be interpreted 
as higher loan rates charged on business loans. The existing finance literature has 
examined the idea that concentrated banking industries have been able to extract rents 
through paying lower rates on their deposits. A number of theory papers have formalized 
this hypothesis, and several empirical papers using U.S. data have confirmed it (Berger 
and Hannan, 1989; Hannan, 1991; Edwards, 1964; Heggestad and Mingo, 1976). 
Demirg̈uç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2004) examine banking concentration in 72 
countries between 1995-1999 and find evidence that when controlling for bank-specific 
factors, concentration is positively linked to bank net interest margins. However, this link 
breaks down when controlling for certain regulatory restrictions.  
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Within the regression framework, in order for banking concentration to be a valid 
instrument, it must be both relevant and satisfy the exclusion criteria. To be considered 
relevant, the instrument must be meaningfully correlated with the firm interest rate, 
though it is not important whether this correlation is positive or negative. There is a 
plethora of both theoretical and empirical literature suggesting that banking concentration 
influences loan rates, either positively or negatively. Empirically, I expect that 
concentration will be negatively related to firm-level interest rates, if the efficient 
structure hypothesis holds true, but a positive relationship provides evidence in favor of 
the structure performance hypothesis.  
The instrument must also satisfy the exclusion criteria, meaning that it only 
affects firm demand for loans through its effect on the interest rate and not any additional 
unobserved variables within the error term. In order for the exclusion criteria to hold, it 
must be shown that the instrument is meaningfully related to firm demand exclusively 
through its impact on the firm-level interest rate. This means that when a firm is deciding 
on the amount it wants to borrow, it does not directly consider the concentration of the 
banking industry when making its decisions.  
The banking industry concentration may influence credit conditions beyond the 
links through interest rates, but this would affect the supply-side of the loan market. That 
is, the banking industry concentration may influence the way banks supply loans by being 
a factor in credit rationing or interest rates charged. Except for the effect on interest rate, 
any influence on credit conditions should affect the way banks supply loans, opposed to 
the amount that banks demand. 
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In order to measure the degree of competition within the banking industry, I use 
data from the Bankscope Database by Bureau Van Dijk. Bankscope contains balance 
sheet data for almost all public and private banks in 183 countries, including all of those 
contained within the Amadeus database. I represent the degree of concentration within 
the banking sector of a country by calculating the fraction of assets held by the three 
largest banks in a country (BankFrac3) . This measures ranges from 0 to 1, where higher 
values indicate greater market share is held by the three largest banks, indicative of 
greater concentration within the banking industry, and it is computed yearly for each 
country.  
In robustness checks, the fraction of assets held by the largest five banks in a 
country (BankFrac5) and fraction of assets held by the largest three commercial banks 
within a given country ( ComBankFrac3) are also examined. These alternative measures 
of concentration are utilized by Demirg̈uç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2004) in their 
cross-country study. Alternatively, I calculate a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (BankHHI) 
for a given country-year by taking the squares of the bank-level loans over the sum of the 
total loans. The results from each instrumental variable are quantitatively similar, and the 
robustness checks will be discussed in detail in Section 8.  
The results I report in this section utilize the fraction of assets held by the three 
largest banks in a country (BankFrac3) as an instrument. Staiger and Stock (1997) 
propose a test for the strength of an instrument under the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients for the instruments in the first stage are zero. They suggest that a first stage 
F-test statistic of 10 is necessary to assume that the maximum bias in IV estimators to be 
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less than 10%, which is the case for each one of the first stage regressions presented in 
this analysis.  
Panel A in Table 11 shows the first-stage regression results, which show strong 
evidence in support for the efficient structure hypothesis, indicating a negative 
relationship between the modified herfindahl index and the firm-level interest rate. 
One criticism of using the measure of concentration is that country boundaries 
may not represent the market for the country's market. Utilizing country lines as a 
boundary for the country's banking market may be problematic because it ignores the 
possibility that firms are obtaining credit from banks outside of country lines, especially 
when banks across country lines may actually be geographically closer to the borrower. 
Unfortunately, the measure of concentration used in this study cannot account for this 
possibility.  
A second concern is that it could also be believed that bank concentration varies 
monotonically with country size. Table 2 shows the bank concentration measures for the 
year 2006 for each country, and it is evident that there is not a monotonic relationship 
between country size and concentration. The three countries with the largest banking 
concentrations include Finland, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, while the three least 
concentrated countries are France, Austria, and Poland. In robustness checks, alternative 
measures of bank concentration and competition are both discussed and reported in 
section eight. 
7.2 Firm Leverage Two Stage Least Squares Regression Results 
In order to identify the effect creditor rights have on firm borrowing, it is 
necessary to be creative with an econometric framework. The OLS leverage regressions 
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that were presented in Table 3 produce inconsistent coefficient estimates on the interest 
rate and creditor rights due to the endogeneity problems of the firm-level interest rate. In 
order to control for this endogeneity, I pursue an instrumental variable framework that 
first identifies the relationship an exogenous change in interest rate has on firm loan 
demand.  
For an instrument that satisfies the relevance and exclusion criteria, the 
instrumental variable result should produce consistent coefficient estimates for all 
regressors, including creditor rights. If creditor rights negatively affect firm borrowing, I 
would expect the coefficients on the creditor rights measures to be negative in the second 
stage. However, it could also be the case that they increase loan demand.  
Panel B of Table 11 shows the second stage results. The second stage results 
indicate that the firm-level and country-level controls are quantitatively similar to those 
that were obtained by the OLS regressions with the exception of firm size, which 
switches sign. The negative relationship between size and leverage is consistent with the 
bulk of the existing finance literature. The other key controls maintain their significance 
and the expected signs. The magnitude on IRCorp becomes more negative in the second 
stage regressions. When interest rates decrease, it is not surprising that firms respond to 
cheaper credit by borrowing more. The instrumental variable results correct for the 
simultaneous equations problem that exists within the OLS framework. 
Next, I examine the effect creditor rights have on firm leverage. For the 
regression examining the aggregate index, this means that when interest rates drop 1%, 
the average firm in the sample, having a leverage of .292, increases its leverage to 
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approximately .310 (.292 + .01 × -1.6973). This is equivalent to the firm increasing its 
leverage by about 6%, which is a much greater increase than the OLS results show. 
Consider two identical firms that operate in two different economies that have 
varying levels of investor protection. All else equal, the firm that is present in the 
economy where creditor consent for reorganization (Reorg) is present will have a 
leverage ratio that is higher by approximately .13. If the secured creditor is paid first in 
one economy but not the other, that firm in the more debtor friendly economy will have 
higher leverage of approximately .09 on average, indicating that it is easier for these 
firms to obtain more loans. However, no automatic stay of assets (NoAutostay) and 
management removal (Manages ) are not associated with increased leverage.  
In previous OLS regressions presented in Table 3, NoAutostay was positively 
related to firm leverage, but after correcting for the simultaneous equations problem, it is 
not found to significantly impact leverage in the second stage regressions.  
Acharya, Amihud, and Litov, (2011) suggests that borrowers may become less 
levered as a response to increased creditor rights because they fear the creditors 
inefficiently using their power. This hypothesis is not supported by the OLS or 
instrumental variable results in this study, but it is also necessary to address the 
differences in study samples. Acharya, Amihud, and Litov (2011) examine publicly 
traded firms across the world. Public firms, by being able to access the equity market or 
international bond markets, can access more substitute types of financing and may 
respond to the local creditor rights environment differently than private firms.  
Both Table 3 and Table 11 suggest that firms are more highly levered when creditor 
rights are higher. This finding is consistent with Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano (2009), 
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who find that the aggregate creditor rights index is positively related to leverage in their 
study of small businesses in emerging market economies. These results suggest that as 
investors are better protected, it is easier for firms, on average, to obtain more loans.  
The positive relationship between creditor rights and firm borrowing is very 
robust and has proven to be persistent through a variety of robustness checks. The 
positive relationship between the creditor rights index and firm borrowing is not just 
driven by size, as it is robust to examining cross-sections differences in size.  
In subsequent robustness checks, socialist countries were removed, since there is 
a question of enforcement ability in these countries. I also remove additional NACE 
codes where government intervention may be more severe, as Claessens and Klapper 
(2005) suggest. Furthermore, I drop each single country and rerun the regression to make 
sure that no single country was biasing the results. Selected robustness checks are 
discussed in further detail in Section 8.  
 
 
8. Robustness Checks 
The first set of robustness checks conducted define banking concentration 
differently. First, I measure the fraction of bank assets held by the largest three 
commercial banks in a country, ComFrac3. The results of this robustness test are 
presented Panels A and B of Table 12.  
The first stage regression results still indicate that more banking concentration is 
associated with a decrease in firm-level interest rates. In the second stage regressions, 
restrictions on reorganization, no automatic stay of assets, and secured creditor paid first 
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all positively affect firm leverage, though management removal does not. These results 
are quantitatively similar to those presented in Table 11 and only exhibit minor 
differences in magnitude, except for NoAutostay which is significant at the 10% level. 
Instead of examining banking concentration, I examine competition within the 
banking industry on the basis of loans. To measure the degree of competition within the 
banking industry, I calculate a bank herfindahl index, which is defined as the squares of 
the bank-level loans over the sum of the total loans. These results are presented in Panels 
A and B of Table 13.  
The elements of the creditor rights index that are positively associated with leverage are 
restrictions on reorganization and whether the secured creditor is paid first. The 
magnitudes of the coefficients are also quantitatively similar to the other results from 
those obtained in Tables 11 and 12 analyzing the other two proposed instruments. The 
results are also quantitatively similar when the herfindahl index is calculated utilizing 
bank assets, though these results are not reported. I further test the robustness of these 
results by analyzing the fraction of assets held by the largest five banks and largest five 
commercial banks. The results of the instrumental variable regressions always indicate 
that the creditor rights measures are positively associated with firm leverage.  
I also examine public and private firms separately and find that whether the 
secured creditor is paid first always positively impacts leverage, but restrictions on 
reorganizations has not effect on public firm leverage. Furthermore, I run regression tests 
by examining different size cross-sections. The positive effect on the secured creditor 
measure and loans demanded is present when examining each quartile of firms based on 
size. I find that the significance on restrictions on reorganization goes away once I 
  59 
examine the largest 10% of firms. This is consistent for what I find for public firms, 
which are among the largest firms in the sample. 
I also remove socialist countries and rerun the analysis and find that all demand 
regressions are quantitatively similar. I also complete the analysis dropping each country 
one at a time. This alleviates concerns that a single country is driving the results. 
Furthermore, Bureau Van Dijk is not provided with information for small Swiss firms, so 
the sample composition for Switzerland is different. I find that whether the secured 
creditor is paid first is still a positive and significant determinant of firm demand. 
Occasionally, NoAutostay enters the leverage regressions significantly, though this is 
only at the 10% level.  
I also notice that there are a number of firms in the sample that are considerably 
larger or smaller than the rest, resulting in highly right skewed variables. I redo the 
analysis with leveraged winsorized at the 10% level, and the results are quantitatively 
similar. I am also concerned that a number of firms within the sample have extremely 
high firm-level interest rates, which may suggest that there are substantial differences in 
the way liabilities are recorded in different countries. I truncate the firm-level interest rate 
at 0.5 and redo the analysis again and find quantitatively similar results. 
The last robustness check pertains to the concern that some countries in the 
sample have significantly more observations than other countries. For example, Italy has 
423,155 firms in the sample, while Hungary only has 7,635. I consider each Hungarian 
firm to have the weight of approximately 55 Italian firms in this regression framework. 
The results for the full sample are reported in Table 13 Panel C and Panel D. Yet again, 
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the element of the creditor rights index indicating whether secured creditors are paid first 
is shown to be a significant determinant of firm leverage. 
 
 
9. Conclusion 
This paper examines the way creditor rights affect borrower financing and 
investment decision-making. By examining a sample of over 1.5 million firms in Europe 
between 2006-2011, I find that creditor rights play a strong role in firm financing and 
investment decisions outside of bankruptcy. I also examine the components of the 
creditor rights aggregately and individually in order to understand which components 
affect borrower decision-making. There is strong evidence suggesting that the different 
components of the creditor rights index impact borrower leverage and investment 
decisions in varying ways.  
The heterogeneity in the Amadeus data set allows me to understand the way 
creditor rights impact different types of firms. I find that firms with low levels of tangible 
assets are able to acquire more loans, though this does not lead to an increase in 
investment in tangible assets for these firms. However, small firm are able to obtain more 
loans when the secured creditor is paid first, and there is evidence that some of this 
money is invested in tangible assets.  
I am also able to test two competing, yet related, hypotheses relating the way creditor 
rights impact firm risk-taking and profitability. I find evidence for both predictions in the 
cross-sectional analysis and that stronger creditor rights amplify the agency conflicts 
between debt and equity holders. Consistent with Acharya, Amihud, and Litov (2011), I 
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find that firms with high liquidation values that operate in economies with high levels of 
investor protection do reduce risk and realize lower profitability. This suggests that these 
firms are willing to take unprofitable projects in order to reduce cash-flow risk in order to 
decrease the probability of being inefficiently liquidated. However, firms that are 
approaching distress, as evidenced by high leverage, do pursue projects that increase risk 
and lead to decreased profitability, which is consistent with the risk-shifting literature. 
Furthermore, this paper suggests that the most important element of the creditor 
rights index is whether or not the secured creditor is paid first. This element is a 
determinant of leverage as well as all aspects of investment policy. When the secured 
creditor is paid first, small firms are able to obtain more loans, which leads to greater 
investment. Furthermore, this element leads to increased cash-flow risk in the full sample 
analysis, which may be seen as correlated with future growth. Overall, when the secured 
creditor is paid first, this seems to benefit firms that may have otherwise had difficulty 
obtaining credit. This may be an important policy implication for countries that are 
considering reforming their bankruptcy codes.  
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Chapter 2 
The Social Costs and Benefits of Too-Big-To-Fail Bank: A “Bounding” 
Exercise 
Written by John H. Boyd and Amanda R. Heitz4 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 Summary 
While the policy of Too-Big-To-Fail has received wide attention in the literature, there is 
little agreement regarding economies of scale for financial firms. We take the stand that 
systemic risk increases when the larger players in the financial sector have a larger share 
of output. Calculations indicate that the cost to the macro-economy due to increased 
systemic risk is always much larger than the potential benefit due to scale economies. 
When distributional and intergenerational issues are considered, the potential benefits to 
economies of scale are unlikely to ever exceed the potential costs due to increased risk of 
a banking crisis. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Special Thanks to Brendan Boyd for Programming assistance. We thank Ravi Jagannathan and Ross 
Levine for helpful comments on an earlier draft; also seminar participants at the University of Bonn, the 
European Central Bank, the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Chicago Federal Reserve Bank, the Cleveland 
Federal Reserve Bank, and the Finance Department at the University of Minnesota - Philip Bond, Murray 
Frank, Jeremy Graveline, Hendrik Hakenes, Joseph Haubrich, Cornelia Holthausen, David Humphrey, 
Manfred Kremer, Filippo Occhino, and Andrew Winton. Any remaining errors are of course our 
responsibility, not theirs. 
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Introduction: Banks, Economies of Scale, and Externalities 
It is essential that definitions be precise. By bank we intend a very broad 
definition, not limited to commercial banks. We mean, essentially, all privately owned 
U.S. financial intermediary firms that borrow and lend. Besides commercial banks, this 
would include investment banks, thrift institutions, Fannie and Freddie and, for that 
matter, hybrid affiliates like GE Capital. We do not mean to include life or casualty 
insurers or securities markets. 
By “economies of scale," we have a very conventional definition in mind: production 
efficiencies that are achieved as a firm grows in size. In particular, we are studying 
production efficiencies of the very largest banks - so called ``economies of super-scale". 
Technically, such economies are properties of the production technology. It is our 
essential that they be kept logically separate and distinct from any ``externalities" 
associated with TBTF banks. There are negative externalities associated with the failure 
of such firms, and there is a large literature on this topic. Specifically, TBTF firms, if 
they fail, may have negative effects on the macroeconomy. That is the raison d'etre of the 
TBTF policy. Both concepts, economies of super-scale and externalities, are fundamental 
to the cost-benefit analysis that follows. The costs that we calibrate are those associated 
with the failure of a TBTF bank(s). The benefits that we calibrate are those associated 
scale. 
 
1. Introduction: Statement of a Problem 
Many argue that the market's ex-ante belief in a public policy of too-big-to-fail 
(TBTF) caused the excessive risk that produced the recent banking crisis. It is further 
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believed that the government's ex-post actualization of that TBTF policy produced a 
series of massive government bailouts (Boyd and Jagannathan (2009), Johnson (2010), 
Volcker (cited in Casey (2010)). Some of these same individuals have argued that the 
TBTF banks are inherently costly to society and should be broken into smaller 
independent pieces. Boyd, Kwak and Jagannathan (2009) provide empirical evidence that 
the twenty largest banking firms took extraordinary risks in the 2000s and suffered 
extraordinary losses beginning around 2007. Importantly, the rest of the banking industry 
did not experience losses to nearly the same extent, and only after the crisis had severely 
damaged the real economy, did small and medium sized banks begin to report serious 
problems. Arguably, problems at small and medium-sized banks were an effect of the 
banking crisis, not a cause. 
An Estimation Problem: A counter-argument to the above is that very large 
banks exhibit economies of scale, and if they are broken into pieces, efficiency gains will 
be lost. It is widely believed, however, that scale economies in banking are extremely 
difficult to estimate. There is a large literature on this topic, and the only general point of 
agreement is that very small banks (less than a few hundred million in assets) are 
generally not efficient. One problem for the empirics is that, for this industry, output is 
difficult to measure. Theory tells us that commercial banks provide three broad classes of 
economic functions: payments services, inter-temporal risk management in the sense of 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and delegated monitoring in the sense of Diamond (1984) 
or Boyd and Prescott (1986). The first function is susceptible to measurement using 
proxy variables such as cash provided and checking account balances/transactions. 
However, the second two economic functions change the nature of the macroeconomic 
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equilibrium (see studies cited above) and are almost impossible to measure. Various 
authors have taken different approaches to this problem, but none of this empirical 
literature can claim to be derived from the theory. 
The policy of TBTF complicates the estimation problem further. This policy 
provides an obvious advantage to very large banks; they have de-facto insurance of all 
their liabilities. Other banks do not. This advantage looks like a funding cost efficiency 
and affects Tobin's Q and related measures in the same manner. Unfortunately, the 
correlation between size and TBTF coverage is believed to be close to one hundred 
percent. TBTF is not any kind of a scale economy - it is just favorable treatment of a few 
banks by the government. 
Recently, it has been argued that reliable estimates of scale economies for very 
large banks cannot be obtained in the current environment with a rapidly changing 
technology and industrial structure. As DeYoung (2010) points out, there are two main 
problems in using traditional statistical techniques on modern banking data. First, the 
distribution of bank size is severely skewed.5  Second, the largest banks differ from 
smaller banks in kind, not just size. Small and big banks operate differently and make 
money in different ways.6 
                                                 
5 Econometric tools provide the most accurate estimates for average companies, but they 
become less precise for firms that are substantially larger or smaller. The three largest 
banks, holding more than $2 trillion in assets, are almost ten times as large as the 
thirteenth largest bank. 
 
6 The literature on economies of super scale is mixed at best. Some studies using panel 
data across countries have found evidence of diseconomies of scale in very large banks 
(De Nicolo, 2000). Moreover, there is evidence that although large banks are better 
diversified than smaller banks, they offset this advantage by increasing risk in other 
ways, especially through the use of financial leverage (Boyd and Runkle, 1993) 
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A Policy Dilemma. If these arguments are correct, then the policy-maker cannot 
ascertain whether the social cost of these large institutions exceeds the social benefit or 
vice-versa. However, the policy-maker must make decisions in real time, and to ignore 
the issue is a decision in itself. This is especially significant at the present time, since the 
recent bailout greatly increased concentration in the US banking industry (Wheelock and 
Wilson, 2011). We believe we have found a new and different way to investigate this 
issue. 
Some readers may not be familiar with our ``bounding" approach, and it is 
essential that they understand one particularly nice aspect of it. We are not obliged to 
produce the best possible estimates of either costs or benefits. Instead, we seek to produce 
benefits estimates that, as the reader will agree, are extremely generous. Similar, we try to 
produce cost estimates that are extremely conservative on all counts. Numerous 
assumptions are made with this intent and will be described as we proceed. If the reader 
agrees that our estimates are substantially biased in both ways, our job is essentially 
done–for we still find that the social costs of TBTF substantially exceed the social 
benefits. 
In this study, we place ``bounds”7 on the social costs and benefits of TBTF banks. 
We estimate the social cost of the recent banking crisis assuming (initially) that the crisis 
was strictly caused by the TBTF banks. We use assumptions that are consistently biased 
so as to produce the lowest conceivable crisis cost estimates. Next, we estimate the 
economies of scale benefits of TBTF banks and make similarly Herculean assumptions 
                                                 
7 It should be clear from above that we do not mean bounds in the mathematical sense. 
What we essentially mean is ``unreasonably biased in a systematic manner." 
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about economies of scale so as to obtain the largest imaginable social benefits estimates. 
Then, we compare costs and benefits using a methodology due to Boyd, Kwak and Smith 
(2005, hereafter BKS). Their method converts both costs and benefits into a comparable 
metric: the present value-added to (or lost from) real per-capita GDP at a base date. 
As we will see in the next section, the costs are assumed to cover a relatively 
short time period, while the benefits are assumed to go to infinity. Therefore, we must 
employ a social discount factor to compare the two. There is an old and ongoing debate 
on how this is to be done, and therefore, we employ several methods. 
Findings. We find that even under these extreme assumptions, the social costs of 
TBTF banks substantially exceed the benefits. Mostly, this is because the estimated crisis 
cost, even though intentionally biased downward, is very large. Our median crisis cost 
estimate is $14.83 trillion in 2007 dollars. The estimates include output losses extending 
a number of years into the future. Such large cost estimates may not be so surprising 
given some estimates already available in the literature (Rogoff et al. (2004)). 
Now, it could be that TBTF was only one of several factors leading to the crisis. 
Therefore, we make probability calculations showing how large the role of TBTF banks 
would have needed to be such that the costs and benefits were equated. Our results show 
that if the policy of TBTF increases crisis probabilities by even a modest percentage, then 
the cost of the policy exceeds the benefit. 
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3.  Estimating the Social Cost of the Banking Crisis 
To estimate the costs associated with the TBTF banks, we estimate the real per 
capita output losses associated with the recent banking crisis. These real cost estimates 
include output lost during the crisis as well as output lost during the time it takes the 
economy to recover to its pre-crisis trend level of output. Using the methodology of BKS, 
we assume that had the banking crisis not occurred, output would have continued to grow 
at the long-run trend real growth rate of the economy. We use two methods to estimate 
the long-run trend in output. The first estimate is simple - a 25-year arithmetic average of 
historical US growth rates in real per-capita GDP over the period 1983-2007. That rate is 
2.27%. 
The second trend estimator employs the maximum likelihood estimator proposed 
by Easterly et al. (1993). With this method, the trend estimate depends on the United 
States' growth rate and the world growth rate. If we define 𝑔𝑡 as the estimated growth rate 
in real per capita GDP for the United States in period t, 𝑤𝑡 as the world growth rate in 
period i, 𝑔𝑡̅̅̅ as the historical average growth rate as of year t, and n as the number of years 
used to compute the historical average, then the Easterly et al. (1993) estimate yields a 
growth rate estimate of 2.16% from the years 1983-2007. This trend rate of real GDP 
growth is defined as8: 
 
                                                 
8 The estimate obtained using the method of Easterly et al (1993) provides a trend rate of 
2.16%, which is lower than the average rate of 2.27%. This consequently leads to smaller 
estimated output losses resulting from the banking crisis when the Easterly et al (1993) 
method is used. 
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We then use these two trend estimates to obtain the hypothetical real per capita 
GDP per capita values for 2007 and after - economic performance that might have been 
obtained had the crisis not occurred.9 
We also need to know the economy's actual output path. We use reported US real 
per-capita GDP figures for 2007-2013. To be conservative in estimating the crisis cost, 
we assume that the crisis ends in 2013, so for the years 2014 and after, we assume real 
per-capita GDP has risen to the pre-crisis trend. Thus, the trend GDP line and the actual 
GDP lines come together in 2014, forcing the loss estimates to be zero from that date 
onward. The result of this procedure is shown in Figure 1. Our estimate of the social loss 
is the discounted integral of the area between the two lines in Figure 1. 
Assuming that the banking crisis is over rather quickly in 2014 and there are no 
further economic losses after that date is a conservative assumption that massively 
reduces our crisis cost estimates.10 
                                                 
9 This method is explained in detail in Easterly et al (1983). Footnote 15 describes that 
the maximum likelihood is derived by solving a signal extraction problem. A Dickey-
Fuller test on the maximum likelihood estimator alleviates concerns that the process is 
non-stationary or has a unit root, indicating a test statistic of -3.023 (p-value of 0.0328). 
The Phillips-Perron test for unit root produced a test statistic of -2.890 and a p-value of 
0.0466. The stationary process further biases our cost estimates down. If the process was 
non-stationary, then this would indicate that the actual level of Real Per Capita GDP may 
never approach pre-crisis levels, essentially making the cost estimates even larger. 
 
10 It's necessary to distinguish between crisis end date and business cycle end date. 
Within the context of this paper, we associate crisis costs with the length of time that 
Real Per Capita is determined to be below pre-crisis trend levels. NBER, however, 
declared that the business cycle ended in 2009. This is different than our definition of a 
crisis end date because by looking at the Real Per Capita GDP numbers in 2009, it can be 
seen that they are still significantly below trend. The business cycle may have ended, but 
the real output losses continued. 
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By contrast, BKS find that only four out of twenty-three countries in their sample 
of historical banking crises re-attain their pre-crisis trend level of output within seventeen 
years after a crisis onset. Pappell and Prodan (2011) find that in developed countries, the 
return to the potential GDP path following recessions associated with financial crises 
takes an average of nine years. As will be seen in a moment, we obtain cost estimates of 
about 45% of base year (2007) GDP. This may be contrasted with BKS who find an 
average lower bound cost estimate of 63% of base year GDP and an upper bound of 
302%. 
Cost Computation. First, we compute the actual and trend rates for each crisis 
year. Next, we assume that each annual loss continues to grow by the growth rate in each 
period. Then, all annual losses are discounted back to 2007 and expressed as a percentage 
of 2007 real per capita GDP. Essentially, we integrate the difference between the actual 
real per capita GDP and the trend values but allow these costs to grow at the growth rate, 
g. A similar procedure will be employed later for the benefits stream. Define 𝑐𝑡 as the 
annual crisis cost in year t. The present value of the total crisis cost is: 
 
where o is a social discount rate to be discussed in the following section. 
As shown in Table 1, when a simple average historical growth is used for the 
historical growth trend, this estimate ranges between 22.55% and 27.25% of 2007 real 
per-capital GDP. When trend growth is estimated with the Easterly et al (1993) method, 
cost estimates range between 46.84% and 52.55% of 2007 real per capita GDP. 
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To conclude this section, we note another source of conservatism in our crisis cost 
estimates. We are assuming that all economic costs are represented by lost real output in 
the United States and assign no weight to economic problems elsewhere in the world. We 
know that the US banking crisis did have economic consequences and caused real output 
losses around the world. However, estimating these costs is almost impossible, and we 
cannot derive a credible way to disentangle the magnitude to which these losses impacted 
or compounded the US crisis costs. Presumably, crisis losses around the world were 
large. However, if TBTF banks exacerbated these costs, which in turn increased the US 
crisis cost, then this chain of reasoning still leaves US TBTF banks at the root of US 
losses. 
 
 
4. The Social Discount Rate 
In conducting a cost-benefit analysis, it is necessary to reduce both costs and 
benefits to a single date in order to compare them. For risky projects, a higher social 
discount rate is typically used in order to reflect the riskiness of the project. We believe 
that both the social costs and benefits of TBTF banks are inherently risky and thus, a 
risky social discount factor seems appropriate. The future benefits to TBTF banks depend 
on technology advances and on the industrial organization of the banking industry, both 
difficult to predict. The future costs of financial crises depend on a myriad of things that 
are also extremely hard to predict. To be abundantly conservative, however, we use three 
different estimates of the social discount rate. The definition and estimation of these rates 
is discussed in Appendix A.1. 
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We note that the risk-free social discount rate of 3.63% is designed for extremely 
safe public projects. This discount rate is not realistic, considering, as we have pointed 
out, that both costs and benefits are difficult to predict. However, the results are reported 
in order to indicate a minimum discount rate in order for the reader to examine the upper 
obtainable bound for benefits and lowest cost number. By computing a riskless social 
discount rate, which is designed to reflect a level of risk less than TBTF costs and 
benefits, this allows the reader to see the most conservative cost to benefit ratios. A more 
detailed discussion of this is included within Appendix A.1. 
 
 
5.  Estimating the Benefits of Economies of Scale in TBTF Banks 
Hughes, Mester and Moon (2001) have obtained some of the largest banking scale 
economy estimates in the literature, and we shall first use their benefits estimates in our 
calculations11.  Mester (2010) has recently argued that these scale economies currently 
remain intact and would be lost if the largest banks were broken up. The literature on 
scale economies in banking, including my own studies, suggests that imposing a strict 
size limit would have unintended consequences and work against market forces. (op. cit., 
page 10). Hughes, Mester, and Moon (op. cit.) and that when managers are allowed to 
make value maximizing decisions and rank projects based on both their profitability and 
risk, scale economies increase with bank size, suggesting that even mega-mergers are 
                                                 
11 Several other studies have found economies of scale in large banks including Hughes, 
Lang, Mester, and Moon (1996), Berger and Mester (1997), Hughes and Mester (1998), 
Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (2000), Bossone and Lee (2004), Feng and Serletis 
(2010), Wheelock and Wilson (2012), Hughes and Mester (2013). 
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exploiting scale economies.12  Their measure of scale economies is the inverse cost 
elasticity of output. 
For their full sample, the mean measure of scale economies for the banking 
industry is 1.145, while the largest banks with assets of more than $50 billion have scale 
economies of 1.25. This implies that TBTF banks are on average (1.25-1.145)/1.145 = 
9.2% more efficient than the overall industry.13 
We define the returns-to-scale parameter as l. For our first benefits calculations, 
we assume that the largest banks obtain economies of  scale that, ceteris paribus, increase 
their contribution to national output by l = 9.2%. This value added is being produced 
under the current banking arrangement and would, by assumption, be lost if the TBTF 
banks were broken up. Thus, the benefit we estimate is effectively a counter-factual: an 
estimate of existing economic benefits that could be lost. 
Wheelock and Wilson (2012) obtain economies of super-scale estimates that 
appear to be even larger than those obtained by Hughes et. al., (op. cit.). We next assume 
their economy of scale results in our calculations. However, they do not provide a 
breakdown that allows us to compare TBTF banks (roughly the largest 20) with the rest 
of the banking industry. What they do provide is an estimate of the economies of scale 
advantage of the largest four banks vis-a-vis, the costs that would obtain if the largest 
                                                 
12 An important innovation of this study is that it identifies and measures scale economies 
not just in terms of operating costs but also in terms of risk management. The authors 
argue that to ignore scale economies in risk management results in a serious miss-
specification. 
 
13 Recall that this study was published in 2002 and employs data earlier than that. Thus, 
at this time banks with assets exceeding $50 billion were clearly TBTF. Their sample 
includes 15 banks in this size category which were the largest banks in the United States 
at that time. 
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four were broken into eight equal sized banks. This cost advantage estimate is 16%, and 
that is what we shall employ in what follows (Wheelock and Wilson, op. cit. p. 18).14 
We have intentionally chosen these two studies from a substantial literature 
because they have the largest estimates of economies of super-scale. The reader should 
note that there is an on-going debate as to whether economies of super-scale in banking 
even exist. Other studies, such as DeNicolo (2000), and as much evidence of scale 
diseconomies as of scale economies. The De Nicolo study employs an international panel 
dataset giving it an international dimension (and statistical power) that is absent in most 
of this literature. 
 
5.1. Numerical Implementation: National Income Added 
We next calculate the percentage of total real per capita GDP provided by TBTF 
banks, s, from the National Income Value-Added Accounts.15  First, we obtain the data 
for the sector called Federal Reserve Banks, Credit Intermediation, and Related Activities 
and employ an average of this sector's percentage value-added to national output over the 
twenty-year period between 1988 and 2007. We obtain s = 3.63%. 
This number is vastly overstated for our purposes since it includes all of the banks 
in this entire sector including the Federal Reserve Banks. Our next goal is to determine 
the fraction of this sector, f that represents only the TBTF banks. The Federal Reserve 
releases quarterly data on domestically chartered insured commercial banks that have 
                                                 
14 Note that their estimated cost advantage must be considerably larger when the top four 
banks are compared with the overall industry. 
 
15 http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/ 
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consolidated assets of $300 million or more.16 The largest 25 banks have about $5,855 
million in assets, the largest 100 banks have $7,214 trillion in assets, while the total 
domestic financial assets $68,301 trillion in assets.17 Thus the largest 25 banks represent 
approximately 8.57% of the sector, while the largest 100 banks are approximately 
10.56%.18 In the proceeding analysis, we attribute the scale economies to either the 
fraction of financial assets, f, that are held by the largest 25 or 100 banks. 
The annual social benefit attributable to economies of scale in TBTF banks now is 
𝐺𝑡 ⋅ f ⋅ s ⋅ l,, where 𝐺𝑡 is real per capita GDP in year t. 𝐺𝑡 is growing, and we need to take 
that into account in our estimates. Our empirical proxies for real output growth will be 
the two trend growth rate estimators presented in the last section. To realize real growth, 
the TBTF banks, like all firms, must retain earnings so they can invest in real capital. The 
fraction of their earnings that is retained, r, is not available for consumption in the current 
year and must be subtracted from current benefits. For empirical purposes, we obtained 
the average retention ratio of commercial banks, defined as the difference in the average 
net income after taxes and average dividends declared over the period 1990-2007 divided 
by average net income after taxes for all US commercial banks over the period 1990-
2007. We obtained r = .3226. 
In the base year, the annual social benefits of TBTF are 𝐺𝑡 ⋅ f ⋅ s ⋅ l, and it is 
assumed that these benefits are growing and continue indefinitely into the future. 
Therefore, accounting for retention, we have: 
                                                 
16 http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/Lbr/20071231/default.htm 
17 https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/FBTFASQ027S 
18 We thank David Humphrey for the suggestion of appropriately attributing TBTF bene_ts to just 
TBTF 
banks, opposed to the entire banking sector 
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where V is the period zero value of the entire future stream of economies of scale 
additions to real economic output going out to infinity, expressed as a percent of period 0 
real per capita GDP. 
From Table 2, we can see that when we employ the 25-year arithmetic average 
growth rate of 2.27% and the Moon et. al. (op. cit.) scale estimates are employed, the 
discounted value of TBTF benefits ranges between 0.53% and 1.80% of base year per-
capita output for the Top 100 banks, while the largest 25 banks realize benefits between 
0.43% and 1.46%. When the larger Wheelock and Wilson scale estimates are employed, 
the benefit calculations are larger and range between 0.75% and 2.54% for the largest 25 
banks. The largest 100 banks exhibit scale economies between 0.92% and 3.12% of 2007 
real per capita GDP. Table 16 shows that when 2.16% is used as the growth rate, 
consistent with the method proposed by Easterly et. al., the results are very similar. When 
scale economies are attributed to the largest 100 banks, estimates range from 0.52% to 
2.89% of base year real per capita output, while the estimates pertaining to the largest 25 
banks range from 0.42% to 2.34% of base year per-capita output. 
 
 
 
6. Comparing Costs and Benefits 
We can now compare cost and benefits estimates. Table 17a shows the cost and 
benefits estimates obtained when the 25-year average is used to approximate trend 
growth in real, per capita GDP. The cost benefit ratio ranges from a high of 46.28 to a 
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low of 10.75, depending on the measure of scale economies used as well as the number of 
banks that are assumed to receive these scale economies. Table 17b shows the cost and 
benefit estimates obtained when the method from Easterly et. al. (1993) is used to 
approximate trend growth in real per capita GDP. These cost benefit ratio ranges from a 
high of 56.63 to a low of 10.66. In all of the cases in Tables 17a and 17b, including the 
most extreme, the estimated cost of TBTF exceeds the estimated benefit by a wide 
margin. 
 
 
7. The Payback Period 
Tables 5 and 6 use a different metric for comparing costs and benefits one that is 
not so dependent on the choice of the social discount rate o. This is the payback period, a 
commonly used analytical tool in accounting. In this application, the payback period 
measures how many good, non-crisis years it would take to make up for the social cost of 
a single crisis. TBTF benefits are not discounted in these calculations, but the 6 years of 
crisis costs must be reduced to a single cost number. To do that, we go back to the 
original cost estimates shown in Figure 1 and define c t as the annual crisis cost in year t. 
In computing the payback period, the crisis cost number is defined as: 
 
We express this cost as a percentage of 2007 real GDP per capita. This is 
symmetric with our treatment of the TBTF benefit stream, which is also assumed to grow 
at the rate g. To estimate the payback period benefits, we use the expression: 
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The actual solution procedure is to solve for the integer value of t above that 
renders expressions 16 and 17 approximately equal. 
When the 25-year average growth rate is used to estimate trend real per capita 
growth (Table 5), these payback period estimates vary between 45 and 62 years. When 
the Easterly et al. (op. cit ) method is used to estimate trend real per capita growth (Table 
6), they vary between 43 years and 61 years. Therefore, the shortest payback period, 
under the most extreme assumptions, is 43 years. 
Crisis Arrival Rates Under TBTF: Actual Experience. Laeven and Valencia 
(2008) document 124 systemic banking crises in 161 countries over a 37 year period. The 
average country is present in their sample for 34.5 years. This means there are 161*34.5 
country-year points (total data points) and 124 systemic crises documented. Therefore, 
the average world crisis-arrival rate in recent years has been 124 / (161 × 34.5) = 0.0223 
or a crisis arrival approximately every 45 years. It is important to note that virtually all 
modern systemic banking crises have involved some form of TBTF policy. Thus, the 
estimates of Laeven and Valencia (2008) give us a modern estimate of crisis frequencies 
in the presence of TBTF. 
We can now compare the payback period to the average actual crisis arrival rate based on 
recent international experience. The shortest payback period in Tables 18 and 19 is 43 
years. The median payback period is 53 years, which is approximately 1.17 times the 
average world time between crises. 
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8. What if TBTF is One Among Several Causes of Banking Crises?  
Some Probability Calculations 
Even without TBTF banks, banking systems can exhibit crises as is demonstrated 
by centuries of monetary history. In this section, we allow for that possibility in a simple 
model in which crises can occur with or without TBTF. 
In what follows, there are two regimes: i TBTF banks are present and ii TBTF 
banks are not present. Banking crises can occur in either regime. In the TBTF regime, 
TBTF banks are assumed to provide social benefits in all years including crises. We 
assume that the annual social benet of TBTF banks' scale economies, as a percent of real 
per-capita GDP, is at the mid-point of our previous estimates. We start with the formula s 
⋅ l ⋅ f ⋅ (1-r). The midpoint of the scale estimates previously examined (16% and 9.2%) is 
12.6%. The midpoint of the fraction of assets held by TBTF banks is the midpoint of the 
largest 25 banks (8.57%) and largest 100 banks (10.565%), which is 9.565%. The sector 
size and retention ratio are unchanged. This leaves with a median benefit of .000296. 
The structure of the two regimes is depicted in Figure 2. In the no-TBTF regime, 
the social benefits of economies of scale are never obtained. In both regimes, when a 
crisis occurs, we assume the same social cost of a banking crisis that was estimated 
earlier. We further assume that when a crisis occurs, it lasts six years (as in the previous 
analysis the crisis was assumed to last from 2008 - 2013). A crisis realization is assumed 
to produce a cost at the midpoint of our previous crisis cost estimates in Tables 18 and 
19, which is .30067 This represents the cost of the crisis in terms of lost real GDP per 
capita over six years, C. We treat a crisis as a single event and including all six years of 
costs appropriately discounted. That's because once the economy enters a crisis state, it 
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remains there for six years. Then, by assumption, the economy always returns to a non-
crisis state. With this structure, there is no randomness in leaving a crisis state; the single 
random variable is the probability of going from a non-crisis to crisis state. 
In this analysis it is assumed that TBTF (weakly) increases the probability of a 
crisis. If this were not assumed, the TBTF regime would always dominate the no-TBTF 
regime by construction. The TBTF regime would exhibit weakly lower expected crisis 
costs and would also have positive returns in non-crisis states. The No-TBTF regime 
would never have positive returns in non-crisis states. Thus, there could be no trade-off.19  
This is not assuming a result because, if the assumption is contradicted by the parameters. 
That will become obvious. 
With this structure, one can directly compute expected welfare by calculating the 
ex-ante expected cost/benefit in any year. Given the simple probability structure, this will 
be the same at all times. In the TBTF regime, the expected social return is 𝑝𝑖⋅C+ (1- 𝑝𝑖) ⋅ 
f ⋅ s ⋅ l ⋅ (1-r), where 𝑝𝑖 is the probability of a crisis arrival in the TBTF regime. In the 
No-TBTF regime, the expected welfare next year is 𝑝𝑛⋅ C, where 𝑝𝑛 is the probability of 
crisis in this regime. 
The results are shown in Table 20, where it is assumed that the crisis arrival rate 
in the TBTF regime is once every 25, 35, 45, 55, or 65 years as shown in row 1. We 
                                                 
19 We are assuming, therefore, that the policy of TBTF ceteris paribus increases the 
probability of a crisis by at least some amount. This is hardly a strong assumption, since 
there is an enormous literature on this topic. Virtually, all of the literature finds that the 
policy of TBTF increases risk. Here, we mention just a few examples in this literature. 
One is the seminal theoretical work on moral hazard in banking written by our colleagues 
(Karaken and Wallace, 1978). Another example is the empirical study by Houston, Lin, 
Lin and Ma (2010), which finds that banks classified as TBTF engage in significantly 
more risk taking than other banks (p. 22 - 23). 
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center the computations on one crisis every 45 years, since this was indicated by the 
results of Laeven and Valencia (2008). The second row shows the total crisis loss at the 
point where the TBTF and No-TBTF regimes break even, which corresponds to the crisis 
frequency under TBTF. The third row shows the break-even probability - that is, the 
value of 𝑝𝑛 which would give the two policies the same expected return. If we assume 
that a crisis occurs once every 45 years, this break-even value is 2.12%. Finally, the last 
row in Table 20 shows the object (𝑝𝑖 - 𝑝𝑛)/ 𝑝𝑖 . This represents the percentage difference 
in crisis probabilities associated with the break-even point. The interpretation is 
straightforward. For the case of a crisis occurring once every 45 years, we can interpret 
column 4 as meaning, if the presence of TBTF increases the probability of a crisis by 
more the 4.34%, then TBTF is not good policy and is dominated by No-TBTF. A more 
detailed version of Table 20 is explained in Appendix A.2. 
We have some values of crisis arrival occurring more frequently than the Laeven 
and Valencia (2008) benchmark case and some values occurring less frequently. What 
these cases show is that the lower the probability of a crisis under TBTF, the larger the 
percentage increase at the break-even point. This should be intuitive; the longer the 
average elapsed time between crises, the more years TBTF benefits have to accumulate. 
However, even when crises only arrive once every sixty five years on average (see Table 
7 Column 6) the break-even occurs at 𝑝𝑛  = 1.45%. Even in this case, if the presence of 
TBTF increases the probability of a crisis by more than 6.31%, it is not good policy. 
Table 20 and Appendix A.2 are both centered about a crisis every 45 years, since 
this is what Laeven and Valencia (2008) find. If the reader believes that crisis occur more 
or less frequently, then more emphasis can be placed on the other columns in Table 20. 
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However, all Table 20 columns suggest that the presence of TBTF only needs to increase 
the probability of a crisis by a small percentage in order to be more of a detriment to 
society than a benefit. 
 
8.1 A Robustness Check 1: “Perhaps a Banking Crisis Would Have 
Occurred in 2007 Even if There Were No TBTF Banks” 
This is a comment we have gotten frequently from readers and discussants. If it is 
true, our cost estimates may be biased upward by the assumption (adopted from BKS) 
that absent a banking crisis, the economy would have continued to grow at its long term 
trend rate. But, maybe not. Maybe there would have been a recession in 2007 anyway. 
Our methodology is supposed to deal with this problem indirectly because the estimated 
growth rate, g, is a long run trend rate that is intended to average across business cycle 
frequencies. However, we can deal with the criticism directly, by forcing a recession into 
our counter-factual growth rate assumptions. 
In this robustness check, we assume that a representative post-World War II crisis 
would have occurred in 2007 even in the absence of TBTF banks. To determine the 
length of the hypothetical crisis, we examined all recessions occurring after World War II 
as declared by the National Bureau of Economic Research with the exception of the 
recession starting in 2007. The NBER declared eleven recessions between 1945 and 2001 
and these recessions had an average length of about ten months. For these recession 
periods, we obtained quarterly data on real per capita GDP growth and found that real per 
capita GDP grew by 0.35% on average. Thus, our summary of a representative Post-
WWI recession is .35% growth for 10 months or .0035(12/10) = 0.0042% annually. We 
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assume that such a recession occurred in calendar 2007, and in 2008, the economy 
reverted to its normal long run trend growth. Therefore, we simply assume that the 
growth rate for 2007 is 0.0042% and subsequent growth rates are consistent with either 
the arithmetic mean or method proposed by Easterly et. al. (1993). 
The cost to benefit ratios assuming the hypothetical crisis costs are shown in 
Tables 21a and 21b. Not surprisingly, the cost to benefit ratios are smallest when the 
Wheelock and Wilson scale economies are attributed to the largest 100 banks, smallest 
social discount rate, and Easterly Trend estimate are all utilized. The opposite extremes 
lead to the highest cost to benefit ratios. Tables 21a and 21b indicate that the cost to 
benefit ratios range between 4.24 and 28.78. Tables 17a and 17b had ratios ranging 
between 8.65 and 57.03 for the same implemented assumptions. The difference between 
the two groups of tables is due to the fact that the growth rate for 2007 for the 
calculations within Tables 21a and 21b is 0.0042%, while Tables 17a and 17b use the 
same trend estimate (either 2.27% or 2.16%) for all years from 2007-2013. 
 
8.2 A Robustness Check 2: Other Potential Benefits Due to TBTF, 
Magnitude 
Many have commented regarding the potential biases regarding our benefits. As 
stated in the introduction, the benefits that the first section of the paper have in mind are 
strictly scale benefits that resolve from a production function. However, many have 
argued that there could be other benefits that are due to TBTF banks, such as 
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technological advances, better diversification, or increased growth before the crisis.20  
This section of the paper is designed to answer determine how big TBTF benefits, from 
scale economies or otherwise, would need to be in order to overturn the findings within 
the paper. 
For the first exercise within this section, we begin with our most conservative 
cost-benefit ratio from Table 21b Panel B, which is 4.24. This panel assumes the largest 
scale benefit estimates along with the assumption that a crisis would have already 
occurred even without the presence of TBTF banks, affecting the growth rate in 2007. 
Under these conservative circumstances, in order for the costs to equate to the benefits, 
the additional benefit component would have to be 12.23% - 2.89% = 9.34% of 2007 
Real Per Capita GDP, which is more than three times the benefits estimate of 2.89% that 
applies to that scenario. We argue that this dramatic benefit increase seems too large to be 
realistic. 
In an additional robustness check, we back out the percentage of benefits 
associated with TBTF banks that would be needed in order to offset the costs. We set the 
cost estimates from Table 1, C, equal to the benefits formula from Formula 3. However, 
because we are considering all benefits of TBTF banks, not just scale economies, we 
replace the l in Equation 15 with a b, which now represents TBTF benefits of any kind. 
 
                                                 
20 Baxamusa and Boyd (2013) even find that large banks are more likely to fail than small 
banks 
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In Table 22, we examine the benefits from Table 1 that vary with the fraction of 
banks examined, f, displayed in Columns 3 and 4 and growth rates, g, show in Panels A 
and B. Since the sector size, s, and retention ratio, r, are both fixed, we can back out the 
corresponding benefits level, b that is necessary to equate costs to benefits. Rearranging 
Equation 6 allows us to solve for b. 
 
In equation 19, b represents the entire benefit that would need to come from 
TBTF banks from any conceivable source including but not limited to technological 
advances, scale economies, additional diversification, etc. The smallest benefits estimate 
is 138% of 2007 Real Per Capita GDP, which is unreasonably large. Given relative 
magnitudes of costs and benefits, we argue that there is no way that unmeasured benefits 
could be that large. 
 
 
9. Conclusion 
Our work needs to be further tested and we encourage others to consider the 
bounding methodology as an alternative to econometric techniques. The policy-maker 
needs to make decisions and cannot wait while economists experiment with new 
empirical methods or search for new data. Our main point is that the costs of TBTF seem 
to substantially exceed the benefits. This suggests that the link between TBTF banks and 
financial crises needs to be broken. One way to achieve that is to break the largest banks 
into smaller pieces as argued by Boyd and Jagannathan (2009). However, there are other 
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policies that could be effective. If economies of super-scale are actually as large as some 
believe and go on without limit, an attractive policy would be to turn the TBTF banks 
into something like regulated public utilities. This would require regulating their rates of 
return on capital and managerial compensation as is done by state public utility 
commissions. A third alternative is to require them to hold very high capital ratios - as 
high as 20 or 30 percent. It has recently been argued by Hellwig et. al. (2010) that such 
capital requirements are only costly because of policy interventions in the form of tax 
deductibility of interest expense and the policy of TBTF. 
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Appendix 
A.1 Estimating a Social Discount Rate 
To estimate a risky social discount rate, we use the methodology of Boardman (2001). 
We average the real pretax rate of return on Moody's AAA long-term corporate bonds 
over the period 1947-2007 and get an estimate of 6.77%. Our second estimate of 5.25% is 
taken from BKS.21 
 
In order for the benefits formula shown in Formula 15 to hold, it's necessary to make 
certain that the social discount rate, o, is larger than the growth rate, g. The appropriate 
social discount rate should reflect the riskiness of the project being examined, which are 
the costs and benefits of TBTF banks. There are risks associated with almost every 
project or investment, even risk-free treasury notes. In order to construct a lower bound 
for the social discount rate, we focus on a method that is designed for extremely safe 
public projects. 
Our third estimate uses the optimal growth model proposed by Ramsey (1928) and 
reviewed in Moore et. al. (2004). We do not believe that this discount rate is appropriate, 
since both costs and benefits associated with TBTF are inherently risky. However, it's 
necessary to determine the lowest feasible option for the social discount rate in order to 
examine the robustness of our conclusions, since the lower the social discount rate, the 
higher the benefits estimate. Thus, this leads to a lower cost to benefit ratio. For Formula 
                                                 
21 This is computed as the average real rate of return of equity for the twenty-three 
countries in their sample. We do not update these estimates because that would include 
the crisis years and result in an unreasonably low estimated cost of equity. 
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15 to hold, it's also necessary for the social discount rate to be larger than the growth rate, 
which is what we find. 
To obtain this estimate, we estimate the absolute value of the rate at which the marginal 
value of consumption decreases as per capita consumption increases e, a utility discount 
rate d, which measures the rate society discounts the utility of future per capita 
consumption, and the growth rate of per capita consumption, g. The social discount rate, 
o, is then defined 
 
We regress the natural logarithm of real per capita aggregate consumption on time over 
the period 1947-2007 and use the slope coefficient to obtain our estimate of g.22 
 
Based on the previous literature by Brent (2006) and Arrow et al. (1995), we use e = 1. 
Arrow suggests a figure of around 1 percent for d. Thus, with estimates of g = 3.6%, e = 
1, and d = 1 we obtain the estimate of the (gross) social discount factor o by substituting 
into equation 20.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 Data come from http://www.bea.gov/. 
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A.2 Probabilistic Calculations Explained 
In this section, we expand the discussion of the probabilistic calculations from Section 
VI. The results are shown in Table B.1, where it is assumed that the crisis arrival rate in 
the TBTF regime is once every 25, 35, 45, 55, or 65 years. Panel A in Table B.1 shows 
results when crisis occur once every 45 years or 𝑝𝑖 = .0222 - as reported by Laeven and 
Valencia (2008). What is allowed to vary in the panel is the crisis probability under the 
No-TBTF regime. For example, in column 1 it is assumed that pn = .005 and we can see 
the net benefits under both regimes. Clearly, No-TBTF is better with these probabilities 
since - 0.15% > -0.64%. Columns 3, 4, and 5 makes the same calculation allowing for 
successively higher values of 𝑝𝑛. As would be expected, the advantage of No-TBTF 
declines as pn rises. In the fourth row, last column in Panel A Table B.1, we have the 
break even probability - that is, the value of p n which would give the two policies the 
same expected return. This is 2.12%. Finally, the last row and column in each panel of 
Table B.1 shows the object (𝑝𝑖 - 𝑝𝑛) / 𝑝𝑖 . This represents the percentage difference in 
crisis probabilities associated with the breakeven point. The other panels in Table B.1 are 
similar to Panel A, except that in each panel we change 𝑝𝑖, the probability of crisis arrival 
under TBTF. 
Panels B, C, D, and E show the various losses and break-even points as crisis occur less 
frequently. The lower the probability of a crisis under TBTF, the larger the percentage 
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increase at the breakeven point. This means that the longer the average elapsed time 
between crises, the more years TBTF benefits have to accumulate. Panel B shows the 
same types of calculations when crisis occur more frequently than the data suggest. If we 
assume that a crisis occurs every 25 years, opposed to every 45 years as Laeven and 
Valencia (2008) suggest, then we see that if the presence of TBTF increases the 
probability of a crisis by more than only 2.37%, then it is not a good policy. If we assume 
crisis occurrence is very infrequent, occurring once every 65 years, then Panel E indicates 
that TBTF only needs to increase the probability of a crisis by 6.31% in order for it to be 
detrimental to the economy 
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A.3 Realistic Crisis Cost Assumptions 
In this section, we briefly drop the bounding approach and employ realistic crisis cost 
estimates for eighteen countries studied by BKS. We continue to assume the TBTF scale 
benefits that we have just presented. The idea is to see how much of a difference it makes 
to drop one important biasing assumption and substitute realistic estimates. 
We assume those parameter values that tend to most inflate TBTF benefits. We use the 
lowest discount rate, o = .036 and the highest economies of scale parameter l = 0.16 
attributed to the largest 100 banks. We also use the average growth rate, since it is larger 
and associated with larger benefits estimates. This amounts to us using the largest benefit 
estimates from the paper, which are 3.12%. In essence, this part amounts to a half-
bounding exercise costs estimates are realistic and benefits are intentionally overstated. 
Table C.1 shows the eighteen countries from BKS, their crisis dates, and the estimated 
cost of their crises as a present discounted percentage of base year real GDP.23  In Table 
C.1, the crisis cost estimates vary enormously - from 24.7% in the case of France to 
232.5% in the case of Korea.24 
 
Table C.2 Column 3 shows the cost to benefit ratios for the eighteen countries with the 
parameter assumptions discussed above. These are highly variable. One country, France, 
                                                 
23 There are four crisis countries that BKS do not report because their estimated crisis 
costs are zero or negative. However, as is clear from BKS (footnote 5), the bias from this 
omission will be very small. These cost estimates come from Table 4, column 2 of BKS 
and do not include the estimated losses for four countries that never converge to the 
original growth path. Thus, we are not employing the upper bound estimates from BKS. 
 
24 The crisis in France involved the failure of just one large bank, Credit Lyonaise. The 
sample mean (median) crisis cost is large at 116% (106.9%) 
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has positive net benefits due to TBTF. However, the mean (median) cost benefit ratio is 
37.17 (34.26), suggesting an extremely unfavorable trade-off for TBTF. Column 4 shows 
the payback period calculations for these eighteen countries estimated with the same 
parameters. Recalling that the historical average crisis arrival rate from Laeven and 
Valencia (2008) is 45 years, there are only two countries with shorter estimated payback 
periods - France and Zimbabwe. The mean (median) payback period in Table C.2 is 87.1 
(89) years, almost double the estimated arrival rate from Laeven and Valencia (2008). In 
sum, both the cost-benefit and payback calculations indicate that TBTF appears to be an 
undesirable policy. 
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A.4 Notation 
b   All benefits from TBTF banks 
BankFrac3 Fraction of total assets within a given country held by the largest 
three banks. 
BondControl  Size of the bond market divided by the sum of the bond market and 
total 
bank loans winsorized at 1% in each tail 
BondMarket    Size of the bond market for non-financial firms (in US dollars) 
c The present discounted value of social output losses due to the 
banking crisis, in 2007 dollars 
Corruption  This indicator measures the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private 
interests. Higher values indicate more control over corruption. 
 
Crights An index aggregating the four components of the creditor rights as 
originally proposed by La Porta et al. (1998) and extended by 
Djankov, McLiesh, and Schleifer (2007). This index ranges from 
zero to four where higher values indicate greater levels of investor 
protection. The four components of the creditor rights index are the 
variables Restrictions;NoAutostay;Secured;and Manages: The 
value of 2003 from Djankov, McLiesh, and Schleifer (2007) is 
used in this study. 
𝑐𝑡     Annual crisis cost in year t 
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d  The utility discount rate, which measures the rate society discounts 
the utility of its future per capita consumption 
Depth An index that measures the information sharing within an 
economy. A value of one is added to the index when each of the 
following characteristics is present.  The index ranges from 0 to 6, 
where where higher values indicates greater information sharing. 
There are six components of this index. 1) Both positive 
information and negative information are distributed 2) Data on 
both firms and individual borrowers are distributed. 3) Data from 
retailers, trade creditors, or utilities, as well as from financial 
institutions are distributed 4) More than two years of historical data 
are distributed. 5) Data are collected on all loans of value 1% of 
income per capita. 6) Laws provide for borrowers rights to inspect 
their own data. A value of one is added to the index if each 
component is present in either a public registry or a private bureau. 
e  The absolute value of the rate at which the martginal value o that 
consumption decreases as per capita consumption increases 
EBITDA  Earnings before depreciation and taxes 
Effectiveness This variable indicates the quality of public services, the quality of 
the civil service, and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies. Higher values mean 
higher quality of public and civil service. 
 
FAssets  Total firm assets. The data are winsorized at 1% in each tail and 
reported in U.S. dollars. 
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FirmLeverage  Ratio of firm loans to firm assets truncated at 1 and winsorized at 
1% in each tail 
 
FDebt  Sum of on-current liabilities in long-term debt and current 
liabilities in loans (in US dollars) winsorized at 1% in each tail 
g    The growth rate of per capita consumption 
𝑔𝑡  Estimated growth rate in real per capita GDP for the United States 
in period t 
𝐺𝑡    Real per capita GDP in year i 
𝑔𝑡̅̅̅    Historical average growth rate as for year t 
Growth   Log increase in sales winsorized at 1% in each tail 
Inflation  Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the 
annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of 
acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or 
changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. The Laspeyres 
formula is generally used, and the data are winsorized at 1% in 
each tail 
 
Investment Change in net fixed assets and incremental depreciation scaled by 
total assets winsorized at 1% in each tail 
 
IRCorp  The ratio of interest paid to current liabilities in loans and non-
current liabilities: long-term debt truncated at 1 and winsorized at 
1% in each tail 
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l    Efficiency advantage of TBTF banks relative to the banking 
industry 
Law  Rule of law measures the extent to which agents abide by and have 
confidence in the rules of society. In particular, this measure 
captures the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Higher 
values indicate stronger law and order. 
 
LegalOrigin  Dummy variables for English (Eng), German (German), French 
(Fren); 
Scandinavian (Scandinavian), or Socialist (Socialist) legal origin 
LogFAssets  Log total assets (in US dollars) winsorized at 1% in each tail 
LogGDP  Log real GDP per capital (in US dollars) 
Manages One component of the creditor rights index that takes the value of 
one if during the reorganization of a business, an offcial is 
appointed by the court, or by the creditors, takes responsibility for 
operating the business. The firm management does not retain 
administration of its property pending the resolution of 
reorganization.  This variable also takes a value of one, if the firm 
does not keep the administration of its property pending the 
resolution of the reorganization process. Otherwise, this variable is 
zero. 
 
NACE    Two digit European industry code 
 
NoAutostay  One component of the creditor rights index that equals one if the 
reorganization process does not impose an automatic stay on assets 
of the firm upon filing the reorganization petition and creditors are 
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able to seize their collateral after the reorganization petition is 
approved. This variable is zero otherwise. 
o    The social discount rate 
p    Probability of a crisis arrival 
𝑝𝑖 Transition probability of going from the no crisis to crisis state in 
TBTF regime 
𝑝𝑛 Transition probability of going from the no crisis to crisis state in 
No-TBTF regime 
Regulation This variable represents the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote market competition and private-sector development. 
Higher values mean higher quality of regulation 
 
Restrictions This component of the creditor rights index has a value of 1 if the 
reorganization procedure imposes restrictions such as creditor's 
consent or minimum dividend for a debtor to be able to file for 
reorganization. If a country does not have such a restriction, this 
component takes a value of zero. 
 
Risk  Standard deviation of ROA for the year before, during, and after 
analysis, winsorized at 1% in each tail 
 
ROA   EBITDA/Total Assets winsorized at 5% in each tail 
s  Share of total real per capita GDP that is produced by TBTF banks 
(Estimate from Flow-of-Funds data, s = 3.63%) 
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Secured One component of the creditor rights index that takes a value of 
one if secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the 
proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt 
firm, opposed to other creditors such as employees or government. 
If non-secured creditors such as the government or employees are 
given priority, this component takes a value of zero. 
 
Stability This indicator measures the perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be overthrown or destabilized or overthrown by 
violent or unconstitutional methods, including violence or 
terrorism. Higher values mean more stable environments. 
 
TanAssets  Fixed assets scaled by total assets winsorized at 1% in each tail 
 
TotalBankLoans Total bank loans in a country (in US dollars). This variable is 
estimated by summing all individual bank loans in a given country-
year from Bankscope. 
V  Discounted 2007 value of the net social benefit of TBTF banks (in 
terms of their contribution to real per capita GDP) 
𝑤𝑡    World growth rate in period t 
 
